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Letter from the Editors
The Gettysburg Historical Journal embodies the History
Department's dedication to diverse learning and excellence in
academics. Each year, the Journal publishes the top student work
in a range of topics across the spectrum of academic disciplines
with different methodological approaches to the study of history.
In the words of Marc Bloch, author of The Historian's Craft,
"history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an
endeavor toward better understanding." In the spirit of this maxim,
our authors strive to elucidate the many facets of human societies
and cultures. Whether this research is focused on politics, religion,
economics, environmental history, or women, gender, and
sexuality studies, the editorial staff is consistently proud of the
diverse subject matter we select for publication.
With the assistance of the Cupola, Gettysburg College's
online research repository, and the distinguished college faculty,
our authors' work has received both serious scholarly attention and
national accolades. Past authors have gone on to publish follow-up
work in refereed journals, and to present their work at
undergraduate and professional conferences. The Gettysburg
Historical Journal is primarily a student-run organization, and as
such, it provides undergraduate students with a unique opportunity
to gain valuable experience reviewing, editing, and organizing
academic articles for publication. In all cases, authors and editors
have also had the opportunity to apply these skills to their future
careers, or to their work as graduate students.
This sixteenth edition of the Gettysburg Historical Journal
continues the tradition of scholarly rigor of past volumes, while
broadening both the diversity of historical perspectives and the
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methodologies employed by each author. Each of the following
works selected for this edition exemplifies the varied interests of
the History students at Gettysburg College.
In his article, "The Nazi Fiscal Cliff: Unsustainable
Financial Practices before World War II," Parker Abt analyzes the
powerful but ultimately unsustainable methods used by the Nazi
government to transform the weak German economy they inherited
from the Great Depression.
Abigail M. Currier's article, "A Different Way of Touring
Europe: One Aid Man's Journey Across Europe During World War
II," examines the memoirs of Robert Bell Bradley in order to
highlight the experiences of one American veteran of World War II
who participated in the D-Day Invasion of Normandy and was later
taken captive by German troops.
Matthew D. LaRoche discusses divisions within the
African American community that arose in response to the media’s
portrayal of black soldiers at home during and after World War I,
and the country’s inability to respect the liberties of the soldiers in
his article "From Crusaders to Flunkies: American Newspaper
Coverage of Black First World War Soldiers from 1915 and 1930."
In his article, "Helpers in a "Heathen" Land?: An
Examination of Missionary Perceptions of the Cherokees,"
Andrew C. Nosti deconstructs traditional views on the relationship
between missionaries and Cherokees in order to reveal a far more
complex interracial and intercultural dynamic in the Early
Republic of the United States.
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Kaylyn L. Sawyer’s article, “A Divided Front: Military
Dissent During the Vietnam War,” examines the ideological
disunity among soldiers during the Vietnam War. She traces these
divisions to a changing culture within the United States in the
years and decades after World War II, as well as revelations about
the government’s dishonesty about the nature of the war.
This edition of the Gettysburg Historical Journal also
includes an article featuring responses given by four professors
within the History Department at Gettysburg College given in
answer to the following question: What figure, event, or idea
inspires your interest in history?
Collectively, these articles demonstrate the hard work and careful
research of our student authors, and exemplify the diverse interests
of our students and faculty in the study of history.
The General Editors,
Caitlin T. Connelly
Julia K. Deros
Brianna O’Boyle
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Featured Piece
This year the General Editors decided to create a feature
piece to show our appreciation for the History Department. We
selected four professors from the faculty to answer a question
about history: what figure/event/idea inspires your interest in
history? Reading their responses helped give us insight into the
thoughts of these brilliant minds and further help us understand
their passion for the subject we all share a common love and
interest in. We hope that you enjoy reading their responses as
much as we did.

Dr. Timothy Shannon
Dr. Timothy Shannon teaches Early American, Native American, and
British history. He received his BA from Brown University and his PhD from
Northwestern University. His book Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of
Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754 (Cornell, 2000) won the Dixon Ryan Fox
Prize from the New York State Historical Association and the Distinguished
Book Award from the Society of Colonial Wars.

I first became interested in early American history as a
child. I grew up in a suburban Connecticut town that had a green
and a couple of Congregational churches at its center. One of those
churches had a cemetery that dated back to the mid-eighteenth
century, and in my comings and goings, I always enjoyed pausing
to read the names and epitaphs that were still legible on those
weathered gravestones. They told me about people who had
walked in my steps two centuries before, long before paved roads,
automobiles, and bicycles, and that sense of time gone by gave me
an appreciation for where I was from, even if my town looked like
all the other towns around it.
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Later on, as a high school and college student, I was drawn
to the study of history because it was a subject I seemed to do well
in without much effort, as opposed to math and other quantitative
disciplines. I did not read much historical fiction, but I liked
biography and other genres of non-fiction, even the scholarly
books I was assigned in my college history courses. As impending
adulthood forced me to think about ways to make a living, I
considered law school, a common path for many history majors,
but was also drawn to teaching. When I thought about the kind of
life I wanted to have, my college professors struck me as a useful
model. They certainly weren’t rich, but neither did they appear to
be starving, and they all seemed to enjoy their work. Of course, I
had very little idea of what they actually did when they were not in
the classroom (committee work is something best hidden from the
young and innocent), but I was impressed by the fact that they
wrote books and articles in addition to teaching their classes. The
idea of writing history appealed to my creative side, and it still
does. I have never exhibited much interest in the visual arts and my
enthusiasm for making music far outpaces my ability to do so, but
historical research and writing perfectly balance my aspirations
with my abilities, and so here I am.

Dr. Ian Isherwood
Dr. Ian Isherwood specializes in modern history with a focus on the
history of war and memory studies. He has taught in both the English and
History Departments at Gettysburg College and serves as the academic
coordinator for the Civil War Era Studies minor. He is a Gettysburg College
alumni having received his BA here, he received his MA from Dartmouth
College and his PhD from University of Glasgow. He is the author
of Remembering the Great War (IB Tauris, 2017) and his articles and book
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reviews have appeared in First World War Studies, War, Literature and the
Arts, The Journal of Military History, and War in History.

I am going to take something of a dodge on the question of
what figure/event inspires me from history. With the limitations of
space here, not to mention the attention spans of readers, any
attempt for me to define and discuss either the many historical
figures that I find inspirational or the many events that I find
moving, might seem flippant. So, I am going to withdraw my
forces in an orderly way, reestablish a line of defense, and attempt
to outflank the question.
I am often intrigued by the fact that so many of my students
wince when I say the word ‘historiography’. The word itself is
neutral – it has no inherent negative and certainly no positive
connotations – but it is a word that is immediately associated with
rigor, boredom, and an undue amount of stress. Yet, this word, or
shall I say what it means – process – is what I find most
inspirational in being an historian. Facts, figures, and events are
the moving parts of history, but they require a researcher and a
writer – a working and curious mind - to actually make sense of
their meaning. It is that role in which the historian has the honor of
playing.
The play itself has three acts: Act 1 (Setting: The Dorm
Room/The Graduate Suite/The Faculty Office) the struggle with
one’s topic, to create an inference/idea, to gather and read one’s
secondary sources; Act 2 (Setting: The Archive) working with
piles of documents and uncovering new ways of thinking about the
subject based on a new reading of the documents; Act 3 (Setting:
The Computer Screen) he struggle to write with sense, clarity, and
purpose – crafting and layering one’s work through revision. (Note
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to self: dramaturgical analogy is not the best way to make this
point).
So why do I find so much enjoyment in the process of
interpretation and writing? I think it is because somewhere
between my eighteenth and twentieth birthdays, I grew fatigued by
the Gradgrind approach to history – rote memorization and all the
‘well actually-ing’ that can come in our discipline. It seemed like
this – trying to own the past by hoarding minutia - was missing the
forest for the trees. Thankfully, I was taking methods at the time
and through that and my senior seminar later on Eisenhower (and
really all my history classes at GC), I grew to appreciate the ways
in which historians interpreted and argued and I was able to get my
hands dirty with documents. I learned that history was malleable
and imperfect, which I found liberating.
Later, in graduate school – surrounded by brilliant
professors and peers – I learned over and over again the value of
humility and the limitations of my own knowledge. As professor, I
have learned just how difficult it is to convey complex ideas and
differing approaches with clarity to students who oftentimes want
answers (and not more questions). At every level of my historical
training, what has driven my interest is not just the people and
events of the past, but how to interpret these things to make them
seem relevant. This – the making of history from imperfect sources
– is what I find to be the most inspirational part of our art for it
poses a daily challenge to the way we see the past in our present.
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Dr. Jill Titus
Dr. Jill Titus’s work focuses on 20th-century African American history,
civil rights and public history. She is particularly interested in the intersection of
African American history and public memory. She received her BA from Taylor
University and both her MA and PhD from University of Massachusetts. Her
first book, Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle
for Justice in Prince Edward County, Virginia (UNC Press, 2011), was a finalist
for the Library of Virginia Literary Award.

As is probably true for most people, my answer to this
question is continually in flux. As a child, my interest in history
was kindled by visits to Colonial Williamsburg and Gettysburg,
and countless hours lost in the orange-bound pages of the
Childhood of Famous Americans series, both of which resonated
with me deeply, albeit in different ways. Ultimately, though, I
think the takeaway for me was that history was made up of stories,
lived by people whose lives were very different from my own, but
who sometimes felt some of the same emotions that I did. I wanted
to understand these people, and “see” the world they saw.
As I got older, stories continued to resonate with me, but I
became more and more interested in the relationship between
historical “events” and lived experience, and in the way the same
event could be experienced differently by different people. I
became fascinated by the idea of perspective – and I clearly
remember the way it began. Having loved Johnny Tremain, I was
thrilled to find a book called Redcoat in Boston in my school
library. The main character was the same age as Johnny Tremain,
and both books dealt with the same events, but Redcoat in
Boston encouraged readers to empathize not with the Sons of
Liberty, but with the British soldiers. I was astounded at how
differently the familiar story of pre-Revolutionary tension in
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Boston came across when approached from a different
perspective.
Books have always played a really important role in
shaping my historical interests, so the figures and events that
inspire me have shifted based on what I’m reading. In and after
college, I read a lot of Civil War and colonial American history,
which I combined with stints at Gettysburg NMP and
Independence NHP. By the time I began my graduate work in
history, I was fascinated by the relationship between religion and
politics in the founding era. But not long after that, my interest in
modern civil rights history, kickstarted by an unforgettable class in
college, reignited, and for the past 15 years, has supplied the fuel
for my interest in history. It all fascinates me – the tactics, the
personalities, the multiple fronts, the shifting alliances, and most of
all, the unyielding determination to challenge injustice. I care
deeply about this field, in no small part, because it connects so
profoundly with the present.

Dr. Scott Hancock
Dr. Scott Hancock’s interest focuses on the African American
experience from the mid-seventeenth century to just before the Civil War. His
work considers African Americans’ engagement with the law, and incorporates
other disciplinary perspectives such as law & society and geography. He
received his BA from Bryan College and both his MA and PhD from University
of New Hampshire. Some of his work has appeared in the anthologies Paths to
Freedom, We Shall Independent Be, and Slavery, Resistance, Freedom, and
more recently in the journal Civil War History.

In 1975, when I was 13 years old and living in Heidelberg,
West Germany, when comic books were 25¢—when kid math was
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still easy, four for a buck—and when the Amazing Spiderman was
still Amazing, I collected comic books avidly (that’s right, we
called them books, not magazines.) That spring my mother, my
brother and I rode a train into West Berlin—my father, an Army
intelligence officer, wasn’t permitted into East Germany because,
as he claimed, his brain was a weapon that knew too much. Soon
after we arrived, we took a bus to East Berlin, through the Berlin
wall at Checkpoint Charlie. East German guards inspected our
stuff…and took what seemed to me a sinister interest in my
Spiderman comics. What I remember is that they confiscated them.
It is entirely possible this is a memory colored by what came after;
maybe they simply examined and returned them. Regardless, the
question it generated was why? Why are they like this?
What came after seemed a stark contrast to sections of
West Berlin we had seen, which were vibrant, westernized, shiny
and modern. East Berlin was drab, run down, almost stifling. The
few people we saw with seemed (to a 13 year-old American army
brat) at best indifferent and at worst depressed. That it was a grey
overcast day didn’t help. For me, the why question stuck: what had
happened to produce what appeared to be two such starkly
different worlds, side-by-side?
That day alone didn’t spark my interest in history. I already
had intense interest in World War II, especially aerial warfare. And
though I was mixed race, I never identified as white, and started
developing interest in stories of Black pride and power. But
looking back, the experiences of moving from a working-class,
racist white neighborhood in Baltimore to a military community in
West Germany during the Cold War, of growing up with an
outspoken Black woman (my mother), of seeing the effects of antiAmerican terrorist groups targeting American military
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installations, of being the child of white man who served three
tours in Vietnam…that one day of moving through the Berlin wall
may have coalesced a variety of questions into two: why do people
do the things they do? And what might get them to do things
differently?
Answering those questions requires a sankofa experience:
understanding what came before in order to effectively move
forward.
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The Nazi Fiscal Cliff: Unsustainable
Financial Practices before World War II
By
Parker Abt
~♦~
The Great Depression hit Germany harder than it did any
other European country. 1 With a fragile economy that was
financed primarily by foreign short term loans, the country endured
a banking crisis when the 1929 stock market crash caused these
loans to be called back. The crisis reached its trough at the close of
1931 when Herbert Hoover had to allow Germany a one year
reparations holiday to avoid a total economic collapse. Three
successive governments failed to stimulate employment before the
Nazis came to power in January 1933. 2 The ensuing miraculous
growth of the German economy, the quickest in history, causes one
to ask how the government financed the recovery. 3 This paper
attempts to document the Nazis’ financing methods, both on a
domestic and global scale. It argues that these methods were
unsustainable, leading to economic uncertainty by the time war
broke out in 1939.
Upon taking power, the Nazis immediately implemented an
expansionary fiscal policy that encouraged job growth through
1

Albrecht Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A
Critical Reassessment,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
16, no. 4 (December 2002): 561.
2
Hans-Erich Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for
War,” in Germany and the Second World War, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 161–63.
3
Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi
Economy (New York: Penguin, 2006), xxv.
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civil building projects and the rearmament of the German
military. 4 Over 140,126 jobs were created in July 1933 as opposed
to 23,665 in January 1933. By November the average monthly
growth in jobs had reached 400,000. 5 This extremely positive
growth trend continued to 1936, at which time the economy
reached full employment. 6 The Gross National Product (GNP)
increased 9% annually while state demand as a share of GNP
increased from 14% to 31% between 1933 and 1938. 7 The Nazis
paradoxically managed to keep inflation and deficit spending low
during this remarkable feat of government sponsored recovery. 8
Though these statistics suggest a command economy had taken
hold, the Nazis actually undertook a campaign of privatizing
businesses. 9 The resulting set of circumstances led one 21st century
economist to remark

4

Raymond L Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,”
Explorations in Economic History 29, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 338; Rainer
Fremdling and Reiner Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany
1933-1938: A Revisionist Assessment of NS-Economic Policy Based on InputOutput Analysis” (Discussion Papers, Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2015), 1.
5
R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938 (London: Macmillan
Press, 1982), 53.
6
Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,” 319.
7
Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Money for the Third Reich: The Nazis’ Financial
Legerdemain, 1933-1938” (Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1998), 7;
Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the
Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 66, no.
2 (June 2006): 390.
8
Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1959), 32.
9
Germà Bel, “Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization in 1930s Germany,”
The Economic History Review 63, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 35–37. Command
economies exist when the central government plans the nation’s major economic
ventures. A key characteristic of command economies is government ownership
of the state’s largest companies.
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We conclude that the Nazi recovery was not a
textbook exercise in Keynesian demand
stimulation… Economic recovery in Germany in
the 1930s remains the paradox case of public
demand expansion without Keynesian demand
creation. 10
The catalyst for such an atypical recovery was a sustained
government campaign to grow the military. Full scale rearmament
had begun by 1934, and 70% of government expenditures had
gone toward it by 1939. 11 However, the Nazis felt it necessary to
completely hide such spending from official figures until March
1935 since rearmament was illegal per the Treaty of Versailles. 12
There was the added concern of causing inflation. It was clear that
early in the Nazis’ reign Hitler did not want to induce inflation,
which would scare Germans, who had vivid memories of the 1923
hyperinflation. 13 He was even willing to harm Germany’s fragile
foreign trade position to inhibit inflation.14

10

Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938,” 577.
Ibid.; Fremdling and Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany
1933-1938,” 23; David Sanz Bas, “An Austrian Analysis of the Nazi Economic
Recovery (1933-1939),” Procesos de Mercado 8, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 294.
12
Hjalmar Schacht, “Unsigned Schacht Memorandum to Hitler Concerning the
Financing of the Armament Program,” May 3, 1935, 2, 1168-PS, In Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946.
The Nazis no longer needed to hide military spending figures because, in March
of 1935, Hitler announced Germany’s rearmament plans to the world, officially
breaking one of the world’s worst kept secrets.
13
Harold James, “Schacht’s Attempted Defection from Hitler’s Germany,” The
Historical Journal 30, no. 3 (1987): 729; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 76;
Martin Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” The Journal of
Economic History 15, no. 4 (December 1, 1955): 392.
14
“Affidavit I of Emil Puhl,” November 7, 1945, 3, EC-437, In Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946.; Klein,
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, 5.
11
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Hitler essentially wanted all the positives of heavy
government spending without the negatives. In response, the
architect of the recovery, Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht,
created MeFo bills. At their simplest, MeFo bills were bills of
exchange. 15 They were issued by the industrial company
Metallurgische ForschungsAnstalt (Metallurgical Research
Institution). But this company was a dummy corporation, cobbled
together by Schacht and German heads of industry with a
capitalization of only 250,000 Reichsmarks (RM). 16 The MeFo
corporation would fund rearmament projects by issuing these bills
of exchange, which contractors could discount for RMs at private
banks. These banks were willing to hold MeFo bills because the
Reichsbank, Germany’s central bank, guaranteed to re-discount
them. To further entice investors, MeFo bills carried an interest
rate of 4%, which was higher than that of other trade bills at the
time. To make sure that the bills were never exchanged for RMs,
which would lead to inflation, the ninety-day maturation period for
the bills kept being extended until the actual maturation period
became five years. 17 Summing up how unethical MeFo bills were,
the Russian Nuremburg judge Iona Nikitchenko called them “a
swindling venture on a national scale that has no precedent.” 18
From 1934 to 1938, the Nazis funded rearmament through
12 billion RMs worth of MeFo bills. 19 These MeFo bills allowed
the government to exclude this figure from their official
15

For an exhaustive account of the MeFo bills system, see Preparata, “The
Nazis’ Financial Legerdemain,” 9–94.
16
Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Hitler’s Money: The Bills of Exchange of
Schacht and Rearmament in the Third Reich,” American Review of Political
Economy 1, no. 1 (December 1, 2002): 21.
17
Christopher Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,”
Financial History Review 5, no. 1 (April 1998): 59.
18
International Military Tribunal, Opinion and Judgement, 169.
19
Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 59.
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expenditure statements (so no inflation could occur) and to
circumvent the Central Banking Law, which prohibited the
Reichsbank from funding the government. 20 Perhaps most
importantly, the MeFo bills also allowed the government to hide its
rearmament financing from the world until Hitler was ready to
reveal it in March 1935. 21 The Nazis knew that dealing in MeFo
bills was a risky maneuver with the potential for immediate
collapse and Reichsbank officials hoped that the budget would
balance before banks decided to rediscount their MeFo bills. 22
After issuing MeFo bills, the Nazis further financed the
recovery by controlling capital markets, which enabled them to coopt private businesses into funding the rearmament and other
desirable, autarkical programs. Instead of nationalizing
corporations as the Soviets did, the Nazis provided strong
incentives for businesses to invest in Reich friendly programs. 23
For example, the Loan Fund Law of December 1934 capped
dividend payments at 6% of reserves and taxed the surplus. 24
Whereas the retained earnings of private companies had been 170
million RM in 1933, earnings increased to 3,420 million RM by
1938. Of those reserves, over 62% were reinvested into the
economy. 25

20

Ibid.
Schacht, “Unsigned Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler,” 2; Hjalmar
Schacht, “Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler,” January 11, 1939, EC369, In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing
Office, 1946.
22
“Affidavit II of Emil Puhl,” November 8, 1945, 2, EC-438, In Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946.
23
Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi
Economy,” 395.
24
Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” 397.
25
Robert Clement Engström, “Nazi War Finance and the German War
Economy” (MBA, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 45.
21
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By 1936, the government also influenced where this capital
was reinvested. One method was through the tight rationing and
regulation of raw materials. Germany was a net importer of raw
materials. 26 Therefore the Nazis found it important to reallocate
their scarce supply of raw materials through supervisory boards to
help rearmament. This reallocation made it hard for companies to
get the amount of raw materials necessary to fund their own
projects. 27 However, the Nazis would release more raw materials
for projects deemed important for rearmament or reaching autarky.
Thus it became profitable in many instances for companies to
pursue the goals of the Reich. As a result, private investment in
autarkical industries grew more than seven-fold by 1937. 28
Furthermore, even though 42% of that year’s GDP growth came
from military spending, the private sector’s fiscal contribution to
said GDP growth was 79%. 29 However the Nazis’ reliance on the
private sector had its limits. Companies still considered the
potential for long term profit and it was clear that rearmament
could not continue forever. This mentality dictated that they would
not produce rearmament goods at as high a rate as the Nazis
desired. 30
An ancillary effect of increased private reinvestment was
that large investment banks lost a considerable amount of business
since companies no longer needed industrial loans to finance new
26

Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War; Tooze, The Wages of
Destruction, 50; Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for
War,” 349.
27
Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi
Economy,” 398.
28
Jonas Scherner, “Nazi Germany’s Preparation for War: Evidence from
Revised Industrial Investment Series,” European Review of Economic History
14, no. 3 (December 1, 2010): 442.
29
Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 63.
30
Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi
Economy,” 399.
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projects. 31 Consequently, companies became more dependent on
the Reich than investment banks because the Reich controlled the
imports of raw material that production required. The Nazis’
capital controls handcuffed the investment banks and they
essentially became depositories for MeFo bills. 32 Once the
investment banks became disabled, the meaningful supply of
money shifted to private savings banks. Again, the Reich took
advantage. Despite a 77% increase in deposits, the banks’ loans to
private debtors surprisingly decreased from 1933 to 1938. 33 For a
variety of reasons, the Reich could control these banks’ loans more
than they could control those of investment banks
There were three main reasons why the Reich
reserved the refinancing power of savings banks for
itself and why the savings banks could easily be
moved by material incentives. First, their structure
of long-term liabilities made such banks
extraordinarily fit for taking on long-term loans in
their portfolios. Although saving deposits were
legally short-term liabilities, in aggregate they
fluctuated only slightly so that they could be
reinvested in long-term loans without risking
illiquidity. Second, the Reichsbank recognised
Reich loans as liquid assets which meant that
savings banks could easily fulfil the liquidity
standards of the Reichskommissar fur das
Kreditwesen [Reich Commissioner for credit
31
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business]. Third, the interest paid on Reich loans
was significantly higher than that on private bills,
which fell from 4.1 per cent to 3.3 per cent. 34
Because of these conditions, private savings banks played a large
part in refinancing long-term government debt as well as investing
in rearmament industries. Their holding of government debt in
1939 was 6.5 times higher than it was in 1933. 35 These banks
became the third major financier of the recovery after MeFo bills
and private corporations.
With such risky methods of financing, the confidence and
trust of the parties involved was paramount. The Nazis needed to
provide economic stability to keep confidence in their unorthodox
methods high. To this end, they instituted strict wage and price
controls. Two months after taking power in 1933, the Nazis
eliminated collective bargaining rights and unions and replaced
them with the Nazi affiliated German Labor Front. The role of this
organization was to keep worker morale high through fascist
indoctrination and middle class comforts such as vacations,
company picnics, and Volkswagens. New laws were passed in
early 1934 that gave government appointed labor trustees the
power to regulate wages for whole industries. 36 The Nazis
succeeded in keeping wage rates at depression levels throughout
the recovery, which benefitted the recovery by decreasing
consumption and freeing corporations to produce more
rearmament focused goods through increased earnings that had to
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be reinvested in production per the Loan Fund Law. 37 Another
advantage was that companies’ profits would directly increase as
technological improvements and economies of scale decreased
production costs. These profits also meant there was more money
available for reinvestment.
Despite the wage controls, private consumption had to rise
as unemployment decreased. 38 As this began to occur,
representatives from the Labor Front voiced their concern that
workers were unhappy that price increases in consumer goods
were not met with wage increases. In 1936 the problem worried the
Nazis enough that they created the Office for Price Formation,
which audited consumer businesses and told them what to charge
for their products. 39 Oversight was so strict that the Reich even
regulated whether certain hotels could give jam with breakfast. 40
Naturally, the Nazis granted more profitable price structures to
companies that produced more rearmament goods. 41 Harsh
punishments for evading the Nazis regulations, including
execution, prevented the formation of large black markets. The
Office for Price Formation is yet another example of how the
Nazis manipulated the free market to encourage businesses to
reduce their production of luxury goods and instead focus on goods
necessary for autarky. As seen with their control over wages, the
Nazis’ control over prices proved largely successful; the cost of
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living was only 6% higher in 1938 than it was in 1933 despite
massive economic growth. 42
While these internal policies kept the domestic economy
stable during the mid-1930s, the stability came at the expense of
Germany’s foreign exchange reserves. Though the Nazis aimed for
autarky, the reality was that Germany needed to import evergrowing amounts of food and raw materials to feed the rearmament
economy. 43 Germany had always needed to import these resources.
However, the loss of territory mandated by the Treaty of Versailles
exacerbated the problem, reducing Germany’s agricultural capacity
15% for many important crops and its iron ore capacity by 75%. 44
Shortages in steel, iron ore, copper, and oil could not be met by
increased production, necessitating the importation of those crucial
war machine materials. 45 The Nazis’ rearmament financial
practices and labor laws crowded out investment for exports and
consumer goods, which strained German foreign exchange
reserves even more to compensate. 46
Whereas the Nazis’ economic policy solutions and
financing methods kept domestic confidence high, they sent
international confidence in its economy into a tailspin. While
Germany’s antagonistic general foreign policy no doubt played a
role, their financial decisions must be heavily considered in an
analysis of their foreign trade weakness. To begin with, a
moratorium on foreign debt payments in 1933 and a purposeful
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default on these payments in 1934 surely did the Reich no favors. 47
It was also lost on no one that if the Reich had the funds to rearm,
it could surely pay back its foreign debts first. 48 The effect of this
mentality was seen in early 1935 when German bond prices began
to steadily decline on the world market until they reached rock
bottom once war commenced in September 1939. 49
It fell to Hjalmar Schact to minimize Germany’s foreign
trade troubles. Introduced in 1934, his collection of initiatives was
called the New Plan. One such initiative to remedy the Germans’
lack of food and raw materials was to pressure weaker countries in
Eastern Europe and South America into bilateral clearing
agreements with Germany. Per these agreements, trade would be
conducted either through barter or, if necessary, in RMs so that
foreign exchange-reserves were never used. 50 By 1938, clearing
agreements had been signed with over forty countries, who
collectively bought about 80% of Germany’s exports. 51 In order to
avoid devaluing the RM, Schacht devised a clever bond
discounting/subsidy scheme that subsidized German exporters on
foreign financial markets. 52 With this plan, Schact was effectively
able to give exporters the competitive advantage of currency
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devaluation while avoiding the inherent increases in import prices
and the national debt.
However, with the 1935 fall in bond prices, this mechanism
became untenable and Schacht told the army that he would not be
able to fulfill their rising demand for imported raw materials. 53 To
remedy the situation, he had to impose a new, large tax on the
businesses profiting from the rearmament in order to keep exports
competitive. 54 This tax proved effective; exports rose, allowing
imports of raw materials to rise as well. The government used
supervisory boards to control the allocation of these imports across
the country. 55 Since these imports primarily went to rearmament
(metals) or autarkic industries (primarily food), production of
consumer goods decreased. In fact, there was no increase in
consumer production from 1934 to 1936 despite the economic
growth caused by the recovery. 56
Schacht had to damage domestic happiness in order to
shore up foreign exchange shortfalls. This would hurt the Reich
over time as average Germans began to notice that their quality of
life had decreased despite the country’s theoretical prosperity. 57
The idea of working for the benefit of the state was not enough to
stop workers from asking for promotions, especially once workers
knew that unemployment was low, making each one of them more
valuable to their companies. To keep wages stagnant, the Nazis
passed laws to keep workers in their current jobs and even assert
that workers could be reassigned at will to industries with labor
53
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shortages. 58 The effect was that workers put in less effort and
domestic production became less efficient. 59
As 1939 inched closer and Germany began to annex land to
the east, Schacht had to keep rearmament growth high despite an
ever worsening foreign trade situation and decreased efficiency at
home. The 1938 annexation of Austria provided a much needed
infusion of foreign exchange reserves, equivalent to 782 million
RM, which doubled Germany’s supply. 60 This allowed Schacht in
1938 to run the largest German trade deficit since 1929. 61
However, the acquisition of Austria actually hurt Germany in the
long run because, like Germany, Austria was an importer of food
and raw materials. 62 By the start of 1939, the Austrian foreign
exchange reserves were exhausted. 63 Schacht had to get more
desperate with his foreign trade practices.
Due to the Nazis’ policy for years of keeping the RM
sheltered from the free market both domestically and abroad, it
became increasingly difficult to value as a currency. The countries
who had clearing agreements with Germany wanted to trade less
with it as a result, instead preferring hard currency countries such
as Great Britain. 64 As Germany’s importation needs became ever
greater, Schacht began to rely less on clever financial tricks than
on outright economic bullying of Eastern European countries. The
most extreme case was a one-sided deal with Romania he signed in
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late 1938. 65 Romania had to accept German arms exports in
exchange for foodstuffs, oil, and other materials the German
economy needed. This deal so strained Romania that they had to
import raw materials themselves to keep up with the German
demand. 66 It is interesting to note that Poland, the first victim of
the German blitzkrieg, was one country that held its ground and
refused to make a trade deal with Germany. 67
Despite Schacht’s efforts, Germany was unable to keep up
with its import demands and Hitler dictated that the shortages hit
normal Germans instead of hindering the rearmament effort. In an
urgent letter written in January 1939, Schacht told Hitler,
“Especially in the field of daily requirements for the home and
clothing, the lack of supply and above all the decline of quality is
most evident.” 68 The analysis of labor historian Tim Mason puts it
best
The whole economic system was so strained that
any one hold-up immediately caused another. These
multiple shortages, which constituted a kind of
negative multiplier effect, were the chief
distinguishing mark of the situation just before the
outbreak of war… it was a general economic
crisis. 69
The confidence of the people and the confidence of businesses and
banks was what the Reich, by necessity, valued most. Even though
65
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there were food and import shortages, they were never so severe as
to put the country at risk of starvation. Having enough food to eat
was not the point; confidence in the Nazis was. The Nazis were
frightened by how shortages may affect the public morale; a
shortage would alert the average German to the frailty of the
economy, which would damage support for the Nazis.
While the supply shortage of early 1939 caused the
working class to lose confidence in the Nazis’ economic prowess,
MeFo bills did the same for businesses and banks. The MeFo bills
that jumpstarted Germany’s miraculous recovery also threatened it
the most. In March 1938, Schacht ended MeFo financing because
he felt the system had gotten out of control. 70 Finally Schacht had
found a predicament from which he could not slither out. Many
MeFo bills were also reaching maturity and the Reichsbank had to
pay back the bills’ worth to their holders. But Hitler wanted to
continue financing rearmament to the fullest. Schacht tried to sell
long-term bonds to MeFo bills creditors instead of giving them
hard cash, but they would not buy. 71 His only recourse was to print
money and run a deficit. But the rearmament campaign still
demanded money as well. To plug this hole, in October 1938,
Schacht tried to sell four packages of long-term bonds to the
public, each containing 1.5 billion RM. Surprisingly, private savers
and insurances funds bought the first three packages but the fourth
one suffered a massive failure in late November after Schacht
introduced it. 72 The financiers of the Nazi economy had lost
confidence a couple of months before the workers did at the start
of 1939.
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The result was that Schacht had to increase the money
supply and run up a massive deficit to counterbalance the loss in
capital and keep the rearmament going. From the start of Hitler’s
reign to the end of MeFo bill financing, the amount of RMs in
circulation rose from 3,560 million to 5,278 million. But from
March to December 1938, currency circulation rose to 8,223
million RMs, effectively rising more in ten months than it had in
the previous five years. 73 The deficit likewise rose enormously in
this time though it had been increasing at a healthy pace
previously. Schacht told Hitler that spending on the military would
have to be cut or incredible inflation would ensue. 74 Instead of
listening to Schacht, Hitler fired him, electing to replace him with
a loyal deputy named Walther Funk. 75 Hitler instructed Funk to get
prices, wages, and the foreign trade debacle under control using
whatever means necessary. 76 A short, obsequious letter written by
Funk to Hitler regarding the status of the economy in mid-1939
highlights the stark difference between Funk and Schacht as
protectors of the German economy; Funk would do whatever
Hitler demanded, regardless of the havoc it would wreak. 77 In June
1939, Hitler also abolished the Reichsbank limit for adding to the
money supply, officially taking Germany off the gold standard it
had speciously claimed to be on since the end of World War I. 78
After that, Funk instituted a war rationing system that gave the
government draconian control over consumer goods with the
justification that Germany was, or soon would be, at war. Funk’s
73
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actions signaled a shift to the wartime economy that would
generally dominate the Nazi state until its collapse in 1945.
Taken as a whole, the Nazi economic recovery of the 1930s
was like a balloon. The Nazis tried to fill the balloon with air but
they could never tie the knot to keep it stable. Their choice was
either to stop pumping air and let the balloon fizzle away or to
keep pumping until it popped. The evidence indicates that they
chose the latter. The Nazis’ call for immediate economic growth
led to financing practices that produced massive short term gain
with equally as massive long term consequences. The success of
their policies regarding MeFo bills, the co-opting of the private
sector, and the regulation of wages and prices all rested on
domestic trust and confidence. While Germans trusted their
economy for some years, the rest of the world, operating mostly on
a free market basis, was skeptical. For an economy that relied
heavily on imports, this was fatal. To prevent a total collapse of
Germany’s foreign trade position, the Nazis had to make sacrifices
that damaged domestic confidence. Eventually, these sacrifices
became so great that confidence in the German economy faltered
both domestically and globally, leading to an unstable economy by
1939.
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A Different Way of Touring Europe: One
Aid Man’s Journey across Europe during
World War II
By
Abigail Currier
~♦~
Two hours after lights out when everyone was supposed to
be in bed, the sound of a sole trumpet rang through the air, with the
sound of “Taps” blending into the breeze. For the men listening,
this song was an inspirational break from the monotony of their
current life. It was a symbol of independence and spirit; these men
were unbroken and refused to fully submit. All over the camp, the
men waited for that night’s performance to start. Every evening,
the mysterious performer had to switch locations. If the guards
ever figured out where he was playing, the punishment would be
severe. For the past week, this impromptu concert, usually
followed by a couple of other, more popular tunes, was taking
place in the least likely place in the world; approximately forty
miles east of Berlin in the middle of Stalag III-C.
A few weeks before, a prisoner smuggled a large box to
Arley Goodenkauf and told him to keep it. Confused, he brought
the package into his barracks and, after checking around to make
sure no one was watching him, he carefully opened the box. Inside
lay a dented, old trumpet. After trying a few quiet notes on it,
Arley quickly realized it was incapable of playing music. For the
next couple of days, he spent every spare moment testing the
instrument and attempting to patch it up. Eventually one of his trial
breaths turned into a serviceable note. Although the trumpet was
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not going to win any beauty competitions, it could at least produce
music. But Goodenkauf now had a serious dilemma. What was he
supposed to do with a trumpet in the middle of a German POW
camp? A trumpet is not an easy thing to conceal and with guards
doing periodic checks of the barracks, they were sure to notice a
trumpet sitting on his bed. His foot locker was not safe either; they
were sure to look in there. Even if he could disguise it, what worth
did it truly have? There were only two things that could give this
trumpet value; its value as a tradable commodity or its ability to
produce music. The trumpet was more of a liability than an asset
because it was so hard to disguise. Because of this, few people
would actually wanted it and it would not have a high trade value.
Therefore, its worth lay in its musical capabilities. Goodenkauf had
learned how to play the trumpet before joining the army and still
knew some of the basics. But such activities were strictly
forbidden by the Germans and punished severely. Was it worth it? 1
Morale was low in the camp; winter was quickly
approaching and the men only had a few threadbare blankets to
guard against the cold. Heat was nonexistent in the barracks and
most of the men spent their days languishing on their beds. Many
nights had been spent huddled together for warmth. Daily rations
consisted of one bowl of thin soup, more akin to flavored water
than the thick stew that these men were used to receiving back
home, and a few slices of bread for the evening meal. This was
barely enough food to survive summer with. The men were
severely underweight and needed every ounce of body fat to help
them keep in the warmth. The only thing that was certain was a
cold future that could include frost bite on ears, hands, and toes.
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German winters are bitterly cold and even more so when there is
no adequate clothing or heating. The future looked bleak. 2
Goodenkauf considered all of this and decided that the risk
was worth it. While the men huddled together at night to stay
warm, he thought that they deserved something positive in their
miserable lives. So, he went out every night and performed for his
fellow inmates. No one knew who he was and every performance
took place in a different location to preserve his anonymity. The
nightly music confounded the German guards, who desperately
searched for the performer. After about two weeks, the Germans
finally found the trumpet during one of their periodic raids of the
barracks. The instrument was confiscated during a morning roll
call and never seen again. However, the trumpet player managed to
remain anonymous. 3
These concerts were one of the very few positive events
that happened to Private Robert Bell Bradley during his time as a
Prisoner of War. Bradley began the war as an aid man with the 30th
Infantry Division as a part of Operation OVERLORD and ended
his war experiences trekking across Europe. While Bradley
struggled to survive in Axis Germany, and later in contested
eastern Europe, global events continued apace without him.
However, these events would have serious and lasting impacts on
his journey. Often on his journey to freedom, Bradley, and others,
would get caught up in the fighting between The Soviet Union and
the United States during the degradation of relations between these
two super powers.
***
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Within the medical corps, there were clear distinctions
between the roles of the various medical personnel. The job of the
aid men was to stabilize the wounded and get them to a battalion
aid station or hospital. As such, their position during battle was on
the front line, running into the line of fire, immediately assessing
the situation, and responding appropriately as quickly as possible.
Aid men had to be able to do everything the infantry units they
were assigned to were able to do. To prepare for this crucial role,
the aid men received hybridized training that combined the training
of a regular soldier with intensive study of medical theory and its
application. The training covered everything from how to properly
wrap a wound to how to fire a wide variety of weapons, both
domestic and foreign. 4
However, there was a desperate need for medical
personnel in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), so this
all-important training period could often be as short as eleven
weeks to increase the number of medical technicians available.
When Bradley enlisted in October of 1942, there were 324,814
enlisted men in the Medical Department. By June of 1944 when
Bradley landed in France, that number had jumped to 553,095
demonstrating that this shortened training had worked to produce a
larger number of aid men. However, the ratio of enlisted men to
soldiers had dropped from 73.5 for every 1,000 soldiers in 1942 to
69.2 in 1944. There was still plenty of room left for improvement. 5
4
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When Bradley enlisted in the United States Army in
October of 1942, his only request was to be placed with a medical
unit. Prior to enlisting, he had been enrolled in a pre-med program
at the University of Maryland. Many of Bradley’s friends and
classmates had either enlisted or been drafted. Bradley did not
want to be left out of the war and felt it was his patriotic duty to
enlist, especially considering his specialized training. So, after his
induction on New York Avenue, Bradley was shipped to Camp
Blanding, Florida, where he completed his basic medical training
along with thousands of other trainees. 6 Basic training for aid men
contained all of the usual parts of basic training for normal
soldiers. However, it was expanded to include medical and surgical
theory and their practical application. 7 After passing the requisite
exams, the aid men were assigned to different units. He was
eventually assigned to the 120th Infantry Medical Detachment of
the 30th Infantry Division. Their job was to move with the unit on
their maneuvers and provide basic aid and medical advice. In
Ocala National Forest in Florida, that meant tending to a
understand, so for general interest questions, these books should be avoided.
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surprisingly large number of snake bites and other small injuries.
As Bradley and the other aid men adjusted to their new role as unit
care giver, they rarely, if ever, had to deal with any serious or
catastrophic wounds. Instead, they had to fight against infection in
the large number of cuts and scrapes the soldiers acquired daily on
their pretend missions. 8
Blisters were also a common problem, though not as
prevalent during regular training as they were during maneuvers.
All soldiers had been taught and practiced basic foot care routines
that, if followed daily, prevented serious blisters. These routines
included drying the feet out completely, applying powder to
maintain dryness and then layering socks as a cushion. When
going on short maneuvers in relatively dry areas, blisters were
rarely an issue. However, on longer marches, or maneuvers that
would occur later in training, this regimen would not be enough.
Bradley and the other aid men spent nearly all of their time on
these injuries. They eventually became so proficient at it that they
even designed a special type of pad to apply to blisters to alleviate
the pain and allow the soldiers to return to training as soon as
possible. 9
Preliminary training for Bradley’s unit concluded with a
multi-day hike through Ocala National Forest. They spent several
days in the forest where the men were expected to spend all day
marching, often wading through streams when they encountered
them. No one had dry feet and Bradley and the other aid men spent
the entire day repairing damaged feet. As soon as one blister was
wrapped, another soon appeared. The aid men used hundreds of
bandages as their world narrowed to the size of the next foot.
Gauze, tape, next. Gauze, tape, next. Gauze, tape, next. It felt like
8
9
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it would never stop. Meanwhile, Bradley’s own foot was throbbing
from a blister he had gotten the day before. Occupied with tending
to the blisters of his unit, he had had no time to address his own
wound. Later that night, Bradley was finally able to tend to his
blister. At this point, he was completely worn out from all of his
work that day. Not only had he spent the whole day bandaging
feet, but every time Bradley stopped to help someone, both he and
the wounded man fell behind. After patching up the soldier,
Bradley had to run to catch up with the unit and the next wounded.
It had been one of the longest days of Bradley’s professional life.
As he drifted off to sleep, Bradley’s dreams were filled with feet
mutilated by blisters. 10
Although Bradley’s practical experience was with minor
wounds and injuries like heat exhaustion and snake bites, as an aid
man he was expected to master a wide range of ailments. After
completing basic training, aid men were required to give basic
medical information and advice to the members of the unit they
were assigned to shadow. This information was often sought on the
spur of the moment and covered a wide variety of ailments and
injuries. The aid men also had to give lectures periodically to
whole divisions on various health related topics. 11 These lectures
varied from the proper construction of a splint using nearby
materials to proper field sanitation, including latrine location and
construction and sterilization of mess equipment. The principle
goal of these lessons was to train the men in how to care for
themselves while waiting for an aid man to come. 12
***
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After completing training at Camp Blanding in Florida and
several weeks on maneuver in Tennessee, it was finally time for
Bradley to ship out. 13 He and the rest of the 120th boarded the
Argentina, which was a part of a large convoy, including the larger
troop carriers and the smaller destroyers and warship used as
protection. Rumor had it that the entire 30th Division was on the
convoy. Such large convoys were necessary to defend against
attacks by German U-boats. German subs, which would attack
single ships were reluctant to fire on large groups. The men docked
at Firth of Clyde without too many issues. Luckily, the entire
voyage had gone smoothly without any major incidents. The men
passed the time in a variety of ways, including being sea sick for
many of them. Boredom was seldom broken on the ship and
Bradley was able to complete a fair number of poems during this
time. Throughout Bradley’s time in the US army, he wrote a large
number of poems and used it as a way of expressing himself. He
would continue to write after his discharge and self-published
several books filled with his works. 14
As preparations for Operation OVERLORD ramped up, the
th
30 Division was shifted from its original camp at Bognor Regis to
just outside of Oxford to be closer to its embarkation point. 15
There was very little to do at this camp but train and that got
boring very quickly and rarely distracted the men for long.
Baseball games became a popular past-time on the various bases
throughout Europe. Not only did they keep the men on the base
and thus prevented them from over running local towns, but it also
13
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occupied a large number of men. The games were often good
forms of entertainment and helped to alleviate some of the
boredom.
On June 6th, 1944, Bradley and the others on the base
awoke to the sound of thousands of planes flying overhead. This
was not entirely out of the ordinary, as the base was located next to
an air base. However, this particular morning there were more
planes taking off than usual. Rumors of a cross channel invasion
had been circulating for months, but all of the men in Bradley’s
unit had assumed that they would be a part of the landing force.
Why else had they trained so intensively back in the States? Surely
they would not be left behind. But, at the same time, the large
number of planes overhead seemed to indicate that they would not
be a part of the first wave. And yet, no one had announced
anything and there was still a possibility that this was not the major
invasion. This could just as easily have been a probing raid before
the main event.
Bradley and the others gathered for the daily baseball game
as if it were any other day. The players took to the field as usual,
but it was clear that their hearts and minds were not in the game.
Each squad of planes that flew overhead drew the gaze of players
and spectators alike. The outfielders were more interested in these
planes than the balls that they were supposed to be catching. No
one seemed to care how well the game was played that day.
Suddenly, all of the radios in camp blared to life and the news
poured out; the landing had been a success. The invasion of France
had begun and the Allies were beginning their long march towards
Germany and eventually the capital, Berlin.
After a moment of confusion, it sunk in; the 30th had been
excluded from the initial landing party. After all their training and
drilling, they would not be storming the beaches of France with the
rest of the army. A few hours later, the order was passed around;
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the 30th would be following in the wake of the 29th Division on the
Omaha Beachhead. Two days later, the unit was loaded back onto
ships and left England. 16 After two years filled with training and
waiting, the 30th was finally going into combat.
***
Two days after the start of D-Day, Bradley and his unit
loaded on to a British ship and were sent across the English
Channel and dropped at Omaha Beach. Even though fighting on
the beach head itself had ended, the men still had to climb off the
ships and wade/swim ashore. Artillery from the earlier fighting
made this difficult for a lot of the men. Invisible to them, large
craters had been created by shelling from the intense conflict,
creating an uneven sea floor. The men would be fine for one
second and then the next the weight of their equipment would drag
them down as the sea floor dropped out from underneath them.
Eventually, all of the men made it to shore. They quickly
formed into a column and headed up the road lined with
hedgerows that the Allies had struggled to establish just days
before. As they marched towards the 29th Division, the true cost
and destruction of war rapidly became apparent. German corpses
littered the sides of the road. Most were missing limbs or had some
other horrendous wound. There had been no time to bury these
bodies and the 30th could not afford to stop to dispose of them
either, so they had to continue marching past these potent
reminders of the cost of war. The Allied dead were even harder to
see. These bodies had been hastily removed and, as a result, a lot
of their equipment had been left behind, the most conspicuous of
which were their helmets. A soldier never relinquished his helmet
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as it often meant the difference between life and death. For these
men, it no longer mattered. 17
At the second hedgerow, Bradley encountered his first real
casualty of World War II. Taking a squad of six men with him,
Bradley heard the call of a young soldier who had stepped on a
mine that blew his foot off. Bradley snapped into action. Before he
had even fully crouched down to examine the man, he had taken
his belt with full medical kit off of his own waist and thrown it
down beside the wounded soldier. 18 Next, Bradley reached for the
man’s belt and quickly took that off too. Bradley then reached for
the scissors that he kept on a string on his wrist and cut the ragged
pant leg away from the wound. He reached for the man’s belt and
used this as a tourniquet, quickly stopping the blood pouring out of
the gaping wound. 19 Bradley then wrapped up the exposed flesh
before getting the squad he had brought over to escort them back to
the battalion aid station. Bradley had just successfully dealt with
his first battlefield injury, but there was no time to stop and
congratulate himself. Already, the call of ‘aid man!’ pierced the air
and Bradley was off on his next case.
Fighting remained intense and continued from hedgerow to
hedgerow for the next two and a half weeks. Bradley was
constantly in motion, trying to save as many men as possible and
this gave him invaluable experience to not only recall his training,
but expand it beyond all bounds. Even though he had hated
somersaulting during training, Bradley quickly mastered it during
his time in northern France. The easiest way to get to the wounded
17
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was to go over the hedgerows and he could not afford to lose any
time in taking a less direct route. Minutes often meant the
difference between life and death for these men and, unlike the
helmets Bradley had seen earlier, these men could not afford to
wait. 20
Bradley spent these weeks treating a large variety of
wounds. The worst were the chest wounds. In order to put enough
pressure on the wound to slow the bleeding, Bradley and other aid
men literally threw themselves across the soldiers while attaching
the bandage. When they stood up, the aid man’s uniform was
soaked with the wounded man’s blood. But there was never any
time to clean up. When he was able to make it back to camp,
Bradley was barely recognizable. His uniform was soaked with the
blood and various fluids of the men he had helped and caked with
mud from all of his acrobats among the hedgerows. His shoes, as
usual, were a complete mess. They were just as dirty as his
uniform, but also shredded from all of the shrapnel and metal
shards that he had stepped on throughout the day. The whole outfit
would need to be replaced. Even when Bradley spent the night in
the field tending to the wounded, a soldier would be sent to find
him to bring replacement pieces for his uniform, saying, “Bradley,
here’s your shoes and a shirt.” 21 During this time, Bradley rarely
slept, and when he did it was often in a fox hole that he dug
himself. This constant action occurred unabated for several weeks
and then continued into the month of August with only periodic
breaks when the GIs made a break through. These break throughs
brought a brief respite to the soldiers, but medical personnel and
aid men continued working trying to help as many men as possible
before the division moved to their next assignment.
20
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***
The 30th Division eventually headed towards St. Lo,
France. The Germans had mounted an unexpectedly strong defense
there and the Allies were determined to break their lines. An army,
mainly composed of Americans, had been massed just outside of
St. Lo to confront the German Army. The offensive would begin
with a massive bombing raid by the Allied air force to weaken the
enemy and then the US Army would punch through the German
lines.
The attack had already been delayed for several days
because it was too rainy for the fliers to see anything. Finally, on
July 25th, six days after the attack had been scheduled, Bradley was
lined up with the men of the 30th when General MacNair came
over to visit the troops. He stood talking with Bradley and some of
the other men before moving onto the next division. 22 In the
middle of their conversation, he heard the drone of Allied planes
overhead. Sooner than Bradley expected, he heard the whistle that
meant the planes had dropped their load of bombs. The whistling
was much closer than expected and Bradley quickly realized that
there was a serious problem. The men ran for cover as bombs
started to fall around them. Bradley sprinted to the right, his eyes
set on a fox hole that would serve as a shelter. Out of the corner of
22
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his eye, Bradley saw General MacNair run to the left. A flash of
doubt crossed his mind as Bradley wondered if he had made a
mistake in not following the general. But, in situations like this,
doubt could cost a man his life and Bradley could not afford to
second guess himself. He managed to make it to the fox hole and
ride out the bombing, which was mercifully short. As soon as they
left, Bradley crawled out of his fox hole and set about healing the
wounded. The wounds that he treated were the exact same as if
they had been caused by German bombs but Bradley could not
forget that these injuries were caused by friendly fire. The worst
part of working on that field was watching all of the bodies being
moved away. Many had suffered bodily injury from the explosions
and that had caused their deaths. The most pitiful, however, were
the men who had been buried alive when their fox holes or
trenches were hit and the earth nearby covered up their openings,
suffocating them. There were no marks on their bodies, but they
were dead all the same. Bradley, at this point used to the most
gruesome of wounds, could not stand to look at those corpses as
they were brought back from the front lines. 23 While bandaging
damaged wounds, word was eventually passed to Bradley that the
attack was still on but his division had been pulled back because of
their losses. He was to return to camp as soon as he could.
Back at camp that night, Bradley heard that General
MacNair had perished in the bombing. Apparently, his body was
so disconfigured from the blast that at first it was hard to identify
him. If Bradley had followed the general, his corpse would have
been among those destroyed by the accidental attack. He realized
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how close he had come to dying and marveled at the instinct that
had pushed him towards life instead of death. 24
***
Eventually Bradley and the remnants of the 30th Division
made it to Mortain in France, the first town they encountered that
was relatively untouched by the war. This would not last long. 25
Hitler had ordered Field Marshall von Kluge, the German
commander of the Normandy Front, to prepare a counter attack
against the Americans. Von Kluge decided to move his troops west
towards the Allies and attack several areas, including Mortain,
France and consequently Bradley. 26 When he reported for duty at
the command center, a major and a captain from General Hobbes’s
staff, the commander of the 30th Infantry Division, stopped Bradley
and told him to hold back. The officers looked at Bradley and said,
“‘General Hobbes has looked into the data on the men who waded
in on the beach head and you are the last one. You are to be moved
to the rear for survival... you’ve done enough.’” 27 Bradley had
basically been in constant action since landing on Omaha Beach
over a month ago and as far as they were concerned, he deserved a
break. While he chafed at the idea that he was not out there helping
people, Bradley did admit that a break sounded like an enticing
idea. Bradley spent the night at the second battalion aid station. He
would not be allowed to rest for long. The next morning a report
came in of a battalion stranded on a hill just outside of the town
and there were reports of serious casualties. Bradley was pointed
24
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towards a jeep with a man leaning on it and told to take the man
and the jeep to the hill to see what he could do to help. 28
Bradley hopped into the jeep and he and the other soldier
started for the hill. The closer they got to the hill, the more shells
and bullets started flying around. By the time they reached the
base, both Bradley and the driver were crouched beneath the
dashboard, desperate to avoid the swarm of ammunition flying
above their heads. Enemy and friendly fire made the trip chaotic
and threatened to kill one, or both, of them at every turn.
Eventually, the driver had to stop and Bradley jumped out of the
jeep. He grabbed two of the stretchers in the back and went
searching for the nearest wounded. Almost immediately, a machine
gun was fired right over his head, causing him to drop the litters
and dive into a nearby ditch. Once the firing slowed, Bradley
picked the litters back up and slowly made his way to two nearby
rocks that had a small space between them. Four wounded were
laying near the rocks, so Bradley worked on them from the limited
protection offered by the rocks and prepared them to be moved to a
less conflicted part of the battlefield. He managed to get the four
men back to the jeep, despite the fact that two of them had to be
carried in litters and the other two were seriously wounded. As
soon as everyone was loaded into the jeep, the driver floored the
accelerator and Bradley threw himself across the wounded to
prevent them from falling out on the bumpy road. All six men
made it back to the small church where Bradley had spent the
previous night. It was now set up as the battalion aid station.
However, command soon realized that their position was rapidly
becoming imperiled and the order was given to pull out of the area.
Bradley and the others left the church and the village altogether
28
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and moved to a house a few miles away down a dirt road. The men
quickly reestablished their aid station and then checked their fox
holes and slit trenches. After assuring themselves that everything
was as prepared as it could be, the men crawled into their
respective holes and fell into a heavy sleep. The men were
awakened to the sound of “Raus! Raus! Raus!” 29 In the pre-dawn
light, the men saw a series of shapes moving around them in the
semi darkness. As the sun rose, it shined light on their new
situation and the muzzles of a variety of weapons. While they
slept, they had been surrounded by Germans and were now
Prisoners of War. 30
***
Arley Goodenkauf was drafted into the United States army
and assigned as a paratrooper. He was captured during the initial
fighting on Utah Beach and spent several months being moved
from one Stalag to another until he finally ended up at Stalag III C
in September of 1944. He would stay there until the camp was
liberated four months later by the advancing Red Army. 31
Immediately after being captured, Goodenkauf was hustled
into a small barn where he and the other prisoners spent the night.
The next day they were force marched to a nearby town and loaded
into trucks. From there they were moved across Germany, staying
briefly in various camps for a few weeks before being sent onto
their next destination. On August 24th, they crammed into boxcars
and began another miserable trip, this time to Stalag IV B.
Compared to the barns, tents, and trains that he had spent the past
ten weeks in, this camp was a relatively comfortable place to stay.
29
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There were beds to sleep in at night, showers were available, and
there was a delousing facility. After two and a half months of
moving around the country, everyone had picked up a variety of
tiny pests and finally they were able to get rid of them, if only
temporarily. Best of all, at Stalag IV B the men were fed on a
regular schedule. Although they never got enough food, it was a
blessing to know when food was coming and how much to expect.
As Goodenkauf adjusted himself to this new place and the
luxuries it provided, he compared his weight to that of the other
prisoners in the camp. Among the American and British soldiers in
his compound, his weight was roughly the norm. Everyone had
suffered some weight loss due to being a prisoner for several
months, but most were relatively healthy. The same could not be
said for the Russians in the next compound over. The Germans
barely fed their Soviet prisoners and, as a result, Goodekauf was
living next to a compound of walking skeletons. 32 This was a
common trend throughout Germany. According to Christina Streit,
“of about 5,700,000 Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans,
only about 2,000,000 survived the war” 33 Most of the members of
the Red Army that were captured were allowed to starve to death,
violating the regulations set forth by the Geneva Convention. 34 At
first, he thought that this oppression had created solidarity among
the Russians. However, as he was soon to learn, that was not
always the case.
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On one of his first days at Stalag IV B, Goodenkauf lined
up as usual for roll call. Across the yard, he could see the Russian
prisoners doing the same thing. As he watched, two POWs
emerged from one of the barracks carrying a third man between
them. The third man appeared very frail and lacked the strength to
take the offered food from the Germans. Instead, one of his
supporters took the food. Arley’s heart warmed at the sight of this
unity and camaraderie. Even in the worst of times, people were
still able to come together and help one another out. After roll call
was finished, Arley hung around to see if the two Russians would
be able to get their comrade to eat anything. Instead, he watched as
the prisoners were dismissed and the two Soviets dropped their
fellow POW on the ground and divided up his ration. Goodenkauf
was furious that these two men would treat a fellow prisoner so
unfeelingly. However, when the fallen man made no sound nor
movement to catch himself, it suddenly dawned on Goodenkauf.
That was no man lying on the ground. That was a corpse. He had
probably died during the night and rather than reporting it
immediately, the two prisoners had seized the opportunity and used
his death to their advantage. 35
Arley felt sorry for the dead man. He deserved a better send
off than being used as a prop in a scam to get a little extra food.
But at the same time, he worried about his own future. The
Russians must have been desperate to exploit their fallen comrade
as they did. Goodenkauf was doing okay now, but his future was
more uncertain than ever and he wondered if he could ever sink as
low as those two Russians. For Goodenkauf and the other
American prisoners, their future was anything but certain and there
was no guarantee that in a couple of weeks they would not be in
the same situation and the same choice would become an option.
35
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Arley spent approximately three weeks at Stalag IV B.
During that time, he saw similar scenes play out over and over
where the Russians plotted and schemed to get more food.
Everyone in the Russian compound was desperate for food and
willing to do whatever it took to get a little extra. On September
18th, he and some of the other prisoners were loaded onto another
boxcar and shipped to Stalag III C. As Arley changed camps, his
future changed as well. Soon, both he and Bradley would come to
know exactly what those Russians were thinking. 36
***
Bradley’s life as a POW was about to begin. After waiting
several days outside of Mortain, the Germans began to hustle
Bradley and the others away from the small town. 37 Often, the men
were forced to jog even though they preferred a slow pace to delay
their departure as much as possible. It was clear to Bradley that the
Germans were in a rush to get somewhere and they were not sure if
they were going to make it. Years later, he learned that their goal
had been to make it through the Falaise Gap before it closed.
However, in the moment all that Bradley knew was that the
36
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Germans demanded that he run and that was the last thing he
wanted to do. 38
The Germans were so desperate to reach their destination
that they even commandeered a truck one morning to drive the
prisoners across the French countryside and to German territory.
There were a number of risks involved in being in a vehicle,
including the frequent Allied bombing attacks that targeted modes
of transportation. Bradley could not forget his bumpy ride in a jeep
at the Battle of Mortain and how he and the infantry man barely
escaped with their lives. He prayed that this ride would end better
than that one had. As it happens, the road that Bradley was driven
down was virtually deserted, making their vehicle easy to spot and
target. Suddenly, the air filled with the drone of planes and the
whistle of bomb being dropped. The driver was forced to take
evasive action to escape the bombardment. He veered off onto a
tiny dirt road and everyone dove off of the truck. The Germans
organized the prisoners into lines and had them lay down in rows
in the ditches along the sides of the road with a German soldier at
each end of the line. All of the men braced themselves for impact.
Luckily, the road the driver had selected had lots of tree cover and
the men and vehicle were shielded from the eyes of the bombers.
However, the fliers continued to target the main road that Bradley
had been on trying to make it impassable for vehicles. The
bombing lasted for the rest of the day, and into the beginning of the
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night as the Allies poured bombs onto the road in their pursuit of
total destruction.
As the sun was setting, the noise finally stopped and it
seemed like the bombardment had finished. The men slowly stood
up, wary of another attack. Americans and Germans together
looked at the damage that resulted from a few hours’ worth of
bombing. Trees had been destroyed and the road was barely
recognizable. Bradley could not recall if there had been a stone
wall along the roadside before, it certainly was not there now. Both
the Germans and the Americans soon came to the same conclusion;
it was suddenly more than possible that the Germans could lose
this war. If the Allies brought that kind of destruction to the
fatherland, Germany would be forced to collapse. For many of the
Germans, this was a new thought, and a rather frightening one.
The Germans also quickly came to the conclusion that
daylight was no longer safe. A group as large as theirs was sure to
attract attention from fliers and there was no way to be sure that if
they got caught in another bombing that they would all survive.
Instead, even thought it would be slower and more difficult, the
Germans decided to move the prisoners only at night to avoid
attracting another bombing mission. 39
***
After several weeks of forced marching through the
German countryside, Bradley and the other prisoners made it to the
French city of Amiens. While there, the men were kept in the city
prison until they could be moved to their next destination. For the
first time since being captured, they were given beds to sleep in
rather than a barn floor. The men had finally reached a place where
they could stay for a while and there would be no more marches at
night to avoid allied planes. Instead, the men would be able to keep
39
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regular hours and sleep at night instead of stumbling in the dark
along dirt roads.
Bradley’s first morning at Amiens was very rough as he
and the other prisoners were woken early by the sound of German
guards ordering them to fall out for roll call. After being counted,
Bradley and the other men in his barracks were organized into a
work detail and marched out of camp. Before leaving, the group
was surrounded by guards, presumably to prevent any ideas of
escape, and brought to an area of the city that had been heavily
damaged by Allied bombers. Through a combination of elementary
German and pantomime the guards explained to the men what was
expected of them. They were to clear the zone of all the rubble
created by the destruction. The Germans wanted the roads and
walkways cleared to facilitate the moving of supplies and all of the
debris sorted by material. Bradley and the others balked at this
idea; Allied fighters had risked their lives to cause this disruption
and the Germans were expecting Allied prisoners to clean it up.
The point of these attacks was to slow down and hinder the
German war machine; to force them to waste their own labor on
correcting the damage. It was certainly not planned to give work to
POWs. Bradley detested the idea of helping the Germans, so he,
and the others, did as little work as possible while in the town. All
of the men moved as slowly as they could. This was partly an
involuntary instinct born of weeks of hunger; the men had become
accustomed to trying to conserve energy at all times. 40 But this
lethargy was also intentional. There was no incentive, monetary or
otherwise, to complete a certain amount of work within the city so
the men strove to be as unproductive as possible. 41 The lethargy
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was a part of this but they also had several other strategies to slow
down work. Rather than all of the men using one central pile for
the debris, each created his own piles away from the others. In this
way, rather than efficiently moving everything to one central
location, all of the debris simply migrated to a new home. It was
often hard to tell what was a pile and what had yet to be moved so
the same piece of rubble could move between several piles in one
day as the prisoners tried to ‘clean’ it up. So, although the street
looked like it was filled with motion nothing was actually being
accomplished. Bradley and the others continued to do this for
several weeks. 42
***
That morning started the same as every other morning at
Amiens; with the call to fall out for roll call. The day before,
Bradley and some of the other prisoners had been told they were
being transferred and to be prepared to leave the next day. The
selected prisoners followed the work detail as they left for the day.
Instead of going to the street that was to be cleared that day, they
were marched to the train station in town and loaded onto a box
car. Once all of the prisoners had boarded, the train left for their
mysterious destination. As the train started to move, gaps in the
walls of the car let fresh air in. Bradley felt the coolness of the air
as it passed by him and he knew that winter was not far off.
Once the doors to the car were locked, most of the men did
not have the energy nor the balance to remain standing while the
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train was in motion. One by one, they began to lay down on the
floor each trying to get their own space. The prisoners quickly
realized that they could not lay down haphazardly where ever they
pleased. There was simply not enough room in the box car unless
everyone laid down on their sides in long rows all pressed together.
Any movement created a ripple effect. They were all so close
together that in order for anyone to move, everyone had to mimic it
to create the necessary space.
Bradley quickly joined the rest of the men on the floor. He
wanted to take advantage of the relative peace that existed within
the box car and catch up on some sleep. However, peace was hard
to come by considering Bradley was forced to roll over every thirty
or so minutes to accommodate one of the other prisoners in the box
car. He soon realized that it was going to be a long ride to where
ever it was that they were going. 43
Upon entering Limburg, the men were sent to Stalag XII
44
A. Inside, their first stop was at the delousing stations where they
took hot showers to kill off the bugs. At the same time, their
clothes went through a special dryer to give the lice in the clothes
the same treatment. Next, the newly cleaned prisoners formed a
line in front of a long table. When Bradley finally made it to the
front, a German officer thrust a piece of metal on a chain to him.
Before he could examine it and ask what it was, the guards forced
him along and the next guy in line was getting the same treatment.
While hustling him away, the guards indicated that Bradley should
put the chain around his neck. When he did so and let go of the
piece of metal, he realized that it was a similar shape to his dog
tag. Stamped into it were the numbers 86042. It was his POW
identification number. In this and other camps, every POW
43
44

Bradley, Aid Man!, 76-77.
Bradley, “Interview,” 19.

~ 65 ~

captured by the Germans was assigned an identification number.
Each number was stamped into a piece of metal and the GIs were
expected to wear it at all times. This new tag always hit Bradley’s
regular dog tags and created a soft ping whenever he moved.
Bradley and the others hated their tags because it felt too much like
they were in the German Army. That clinking would follow him
across Europe and served as a constant reminder of his capture by
the Germans. After being processed, Bradley and many others
were put on a train bound for places unknown. 45
***
After spending what felt like several days being moved
from one train to another, Bradley and the other prisoners got off
of the train expecting to be immediately herded onto the next one.
Instead, they were surrounded by guards and marched down the
road away from the train station. The guards led the men to the
most desolate place that Bradley had ever seen. Dozens of short,
long buildings were surrounded by fences topped with barbed wire.
Placed periodically within the wall were guard towers, each
manned by large spot lights and heavily armed Germans. The
guards forced the men to pass under their gaze as they entered the
gates of Stalag III C.
As Bradley took his first look at the camp, he noticed that
there were no plants within the compound. No trees grew to
provide shade nor any grass to carpet the ground. The Germans
had even managed to defeat the tenacious weed that always
managed to grow everywhere. 46 If a plant that had evolved to
survive in some of the least hospitable environments in the world
could not live here, how was a lonely boy from DC expected to
make it?
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46

Bradley, Aid Man!, 77.
Bradley, Aid Man!, 80.

~ 66 ~

***
Bradley and the other men were brought into the camp and
processed. They were assigned to three room barracks with each
room holding between twenty-seven and thirty-three prisoners.
There was one lone bulb in each room to provide light at night.
However, this only lasted until 9 o’clock when all the lights were
turned off and the men were expected to be in bed. Just before
lights out, the men would spend a few minutes catching all the lice
and other bugs crawling on them and worked together to crush
them using their finger nails. Along with the light bulb, the only
other amenity in the barracks was a lone stove that rarely had
enough coal. The men often spent the nights huddled together
under thin blankets, hoping to survive the night. Morning brought
little respite for the men, who were ordered out into the freezing
yard to be counted. Those lucky enough to have some food were
allowed to eat it and then they returned to their barracks to pass the
day. When food was available, it was often of very poor quality.
The prisoners got a small cup of watery soup made almost
exclusively of sauerkraut for lunch. For supper, they would
occasionally get a potato, turnip or rutabaga if they were lucky and
a slice of bread, the equivalent of 1000 grams. 47 All of the food in
the camps was very strictly rationed and controlled, as it was in the
rest of Germany. 48 Due to this rationing, the bread that the
47

Bradley, “Interview” 19-21; Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoir, 8.
Rationing all over Germany began in 1939 before the fateful invasion of
Poland but increased dramatically after the failed invasion of Russia. Desperate
for food, the Germans had originally planned on utilizing their conquered
territories as an unlimited supply of food and other crucial supplies for the
German War Machine. This plan ultimately failed, in no small part due to the
intense fighting that these regions suffered. In order to acquire the necessary
food, the Germans in 1942 decided to invade Russia, a comparative bread basket
to the food that Germany was operating with. The initial invasion was projected
to last approximately three months, after which all of the food of Russia would
be made available to the Nazi Regime. As history tells us, this was not quite
48

~ 67 ~

prisoners received was often of extremely poor quality. Flour, and
grain in general, were in high demand across Germany, so the
smallest amount possible was used to create the prisoners’ bread.
To supplement the meager amount of flour used, the Germans
mixed saw dust and wood chips into the batter to thicken it and
prepare it for baking. 49 Although nearly unpalatable, when the
men were starving, it was better than nothing. The occasional snap
pea, if they had any, was reserved strictly for Sundays. The call of
‘Meat!’ was a cause for celebration as meat had become a precious
commodity within the camp. 50
During their forced march to get to Stalag III C, food had
been a rare commodity and the men often went days in between
meals. 51 When Bradley finally arrived at the camp, he expected
that they would be fed on a more regular schedule. While this did
occur, the amount of food that the men were receiving was
minuscule compared to what their bodies required. The American
POWS never reached the level of starvation experienced by the
Russian prisoners, who were specifically targeted for starvation
and deliberately received an insufficient amount of food. Red
accurate and the Germans never successfully exploit the food reserves they
imagined were waiting for them in Russia. Instead, rationing ramps up and
seriously affects POW. Combined with the sharp increase of POWs in the early
1940’s and this overall lack of food supplies, POWs were fed the bare
minimum. The Nazis believed that any food given to POWs was taken from the
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Cross packages often contained gifts of food and the POWs used
this to supplement their diets and fend off starvation. 52
***
Unlike Amiens, there was no work required of the prisoners
at Stalag III C. Other than falling out for roll call when called,
nothing was expected of the men and consequently they had a lot
of free time on their hands. The prisoners learned to adapt and
found activities to occupy themselves. Some of the Red Cross
packages had included packs of cards, so many them passed their
days sitting on the floor of the barracks playing cards. Bradley
occasionally played a hand or two, but when the stakes got too
high he left. Often, the men cleared a space on the floor and put
pieces of straw in the middle. For some, that was all that they had
to bet with. For others, that was the highest they were willing to
go. The games were supposed to just be a fun way to pass the time.
It was when the men threw down cigarettes or food as their bet that
some of the lower betters left, including Bradley.
During one card game, Bradley was sitting on the floor of
the barracks with some other men playing a round of poker. The
betting was very low stakes. So far, only straw had been thrown
into the betting circle. After several rounds of this, another prisoner
joined the group. The new comer was given the honor of placing
the first bet. Instead of grabbing a nearby piece of straw, the new
prisoner took a cigarette out of his pocket and placed it in the small
clearing. His audience paused, unsure of what to do next. Bradley
and one of the other men quickly got up and left the game. Bradley
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went to search for one of the few books that were available at the
camp. Even though he had read most of the ones that the prisoners
had access to, anything was better than wasting cigarettes on such
a pointless activity. While he walked away, the rest reluctantly
reached for their own packs. For many cigarettes were too valuable
to risk in such a way. They were the only form of currency among
the prisoners and worked with some of the guards. Bradley had
even heard a rumor that a prisoner with a full carton of cigarettes
could bribe his way not only out of the camp but also out of
Europe. As such, many men, Bradley among them, requested large
numbers of cigarettes when they wrote to their families. No
packages ever arrived and the prisoners assumed that the guards
had stolen them because of their valuable contents. Red Cross
packages did occasionally contain cigarettes but there were never
enough to make a whole carton. Regardless, Bradley held onto that
dream and jealously guarded his supply. 53
Cigarettes were also better than cash inside of a POW
camp. A few slipped to one of the guards equaled a few extra
pieces of food that night or some other small comfort. Extra coal
for the furnace or another bottle of soap could make the difference
to a Prisoner of War. Bradley lived among these men for several
months and knew just how desperate they were.
Some of the men in the camp were desperate for things
other than food or small comfort. These men were addicted to
smoking. Tobacco had always been readily available in the army. 54
For many of the men, Stalag III C was the first time that they were
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without a steady supply of the substance. Many did not know how
to handle it and some went to drastic measures to get the fix that
they craved. When Bradley first entered Stalag III C, he had
noticed how barren and lifeless it was. Initially, he had blamed the
lack of flora on the Germans, but he later found out that it had
actually been caused by some of the heavy smokers in camp. In
their desperate need, several had gathered up all of the plants and
dried them out. They then tried smoking the leaves, often with
poor results. However, that solution did not last very long. Once
the plants were gone, the men started chipping away some of the
posts and beams inside of the barracks. They took the resulting
wood chips and tried to smoke them in crude pipes. This too did
not end well but that never stopped the prisoners. In some areas,
their carving was so extensive that posts became unstable and the
other prisoners had to force the smoker to stop for everyone’s
safety.
The smoking of wood chips was the act of a man in need,
but it was not the most desperate thing that Bradley witnessed.
While in the camp, he saw several prisoners trading their rations to
other prisoners for some cigarettes. In an environment where their
next meal could literally make the difference between life and
death that action alone told Bradley how desperate some of these
men were.
As one of the aid men in camp, Bradley was expected to,
and felt obligated to, help the sick and wounded as much as he
could. Even though he rarely had any supplies, he tried to offer
what assistance he could. Due to this compassion, Bradley spent
many nights sitting with the smokers when their newest
experiment went horribly wrong. Although he could not provide
any actual medical aid, he offered what encouragement he could. 55
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***
After days filled with hearing rumors about the advance of
the Soviet Army, on January 31st, Bradley and the other prisoners
got the order they had been dreading. The next morning the entire
camp would be evacuated. Prisoners were expected to gather their
belongings and be prepared to move out immediately following
roll call. Across the compound, in the rec hall, Goodenkauf and the
other performing prisoners realized that their time had come. For
several weeks, they had been digging a hole to store supplies and
hide in. 56 That night, they moved their belongings into the hole and
the following morning Goodenkauf and the others climbed in.
Another of the prisoners put a metal plate over the hole and moved
the stove onto it to cover and disguise the opening.
Meanwhile, the prisoners outside of the rec hall were doing
all that they could to delay their departure. They were successful
for over two hours. However, at approximately 10 o’clock, the
guards set up machine gun nests within the camp. The prisoners
were given two choices; either they could form into a column and
move out, or the guards would open fire. A column was quickly
formed and the prisoners were marched out. They followed the
road out of the prison gates. For many of the men, this was the first
time in months that they were not surrounded by fences and barbed
wire. Even though the men wanted to stand and look around at
land not enclosed by fences, the German soldiers kept forcing them
along. The Germans needed to make it away from the Stalag
before the Russians arrived. Unbeknownst to them, an advanced
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unit of the Russian army had come up to the camp and surrounded
it with tanks. The column of POWs was marched straight into a
line of Russian tanks. 57
The Soviet army saw the first line of German guards and a
large column of men marching towards them. Thinking that these
men were all German soldiers, they opened fire. Guards and
prisoners alike dove into the snow under the sudden barrage of
tank fire. The Germans quickly gathered up their charges and
herded them back towards camp. The prisoners followed without
any issues as the thought of immediate death put any plans of
escape out of their minds. Several of the prisoners were forced to
help some of their comrades back as they had been wounded
during the onslaught. 58 Once back behind the wire fences, the
Germans hurried to organize a second evacuation. All of the
prisoners were lined up again and the Germans prepared to march
them out of camp using a different gate.
This time, the Germans barely made it past the fence before
they saw Russian tanks on the horizon. Once again, the men ran
back for the relative security of the camp and the Germans
prepared to defend the camp against the invaders. Meanwhile, the
prisoners were permitted to wander around the compound and
many returned to their barracks. While in there, Bradley watched
as the Russians overran the camp and defeated the few Germans
who tried to defend the Stalag. The Russians executed nearly all of
the guards as they swept through the camp. However, German
reinforcements quickly arrived at the compound and opened fire on
the Russians. The POWs were caught in the no man’s zone of a
battle with the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other.
Bullets and artillery shells flew through the air from both
57
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directions, making any area outside a serious hazard. Bradley and
another man inside his barrack tried to sneak a look outside
through their window and came face to face with a German fighter
pilot. The flier was down so low that Bradley’s head was about
even with the barrels of the machine guns attached to the plane.
Both men dropped to the floor moments before the gunner opened
fire. It was at that moment that Bradley, and many others, decided
that the camp was too dangerous to stay in and made preparations
to leave. 59
The next morning, nearly all of the soldiers retraced their
steps from the day before and walked out of the gates of Stalag III
C, but this time for the final time. The large mass soon divided up
into smaller groups as everyone migrated towards their friends.
This arrangement also worked out better for foraging needs. The
Russians had few supplies and preferred to live off the land. They
expected the former prisoners to do the same. It was easier to
forage with a group of ten men than with a group of a hundred, so
the men broke apart. 60
Bradley eventually joined a group of seven to nine other
GIs. The group contained a mixed cast of characters, including a
man who spoke English, German and Polish, an Irishman who was
very handy and a Mexican who was very adept at survival.
Together they started what was bound to be a very long walk. 61
***
As Bradley and the others made their way across Europe,
they realized they were going to need to find a source of food, and
quickly. They were completely on their own and had to adapt to
survive. The Russians had not prepared to liberate any POW
59
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camps and consequently had no infrastructure in place to deal with
them. 62 The men spent most nights in abandoned barns, sleeping in
the hay. The Russians, who had moved through the area some
weeks before, had eaten all of the available food. All that was left
was the feed bin for the livestock. This was barely palatable food
as the grain it contained was very course. However, the men
stewed it with large amounts of water to make an oatmeal
substitute that served their needs. The men ate this meal as often as
they could because the Russian Army had left no other option and
food was scarce. The Russians had moved through the Polish
countryside like a plague of locust until nothing was left; no
produce nor livestock had survived their onslaught. 63
The only thing that seemed to have survived were a few
chickens scattered in various areas. These were often unavailable
as they were often already claimed by Russian soldiers staying
nearby and being caught with one of their chickens was paramount
to a death sentence. One night though, after they had finished their
evening gruel but before they had bedded down for the night, the
men decided that they wanted a little meat to round out their meal.
On their way to the abandoned house they were spending the night
in, the men had passed a chicken coop and had seen a few chickens
milling around outside. Even just talking about having meat made
some of the men salivate; they had not had any for several weeks
and that which they had had was of a questionable nature, whose
origins were unclear.
The men all gathered together to discuss their strategy. It
would not be enough to simply walk into the coop and grab a
chicken. Even if they managed to grab the animal by the neck and
silence it, it would still flap its wings and wake the other birds who
62
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would then set up a ruckus. Under normal circumstances, this
would not be an issue, but the noise would inevitably wake a
nearby Russian who would roll over in his sleep and let loose a
burst of gunfire at the chicken coop to dissuade potential thieves.
The unarmed men wanted to avoid this fate at all costs.
One of the men in the group, a Mexican, was particularly
adept at catching chickens and explained the correct procedure to
the rest of the group. Rather than killing the bird inside of the
coop, the trick was to slip a finger right under the feet of the
chicken along the pole it was roosting on. The chicken’s feet
would then instinctively curl around the finger and the thief would
be able to walk out of the coop with the sleeping bird on his finger.
Once far enough away, the animal’s neck could be rung and
preparations for the feast could begin. 64
Bradley and a few others followed the Mexican’s
suggestion and managed to capture several chickens unobserved
and prepared a thick stew with hearty amounts of meat. As they
were sitting down to eat, a loud noise sounded outside of the
building and the front door came crashing down. Before the men
could run for cover, a Russian patrol, made up of both men and
women, streamed into the room with all of their guns aimed at
Bradley and his men. One of the women demanded to know if the
men were Germans. Based on the way the rest of the soldiers were
deferring to her, Bradley determined that she was probably their
commanding officer. Giving her the wrong answer at this point
meant death by firing squad. Germans were forbidden from
gathering and if these soldiers thought for a moment that Bradley
and his men were German, they would shoot without asking any
further questions. Better a dead mistake than a live German.
Bradley and the others in his group all started yelling
64
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‘Amerikansky’ at the top of their lungs. They assumed that it
meant American in Russian, but none of them were sure if it
actually meant anything. It had worked with earlier patrols and
they desperately hoped that it would work now. Bradley saw
confusion enter some of the Russian’s eyes and many of their stern
faces softened. However, the guns were still pointed at the group
and Bradley had run out of ideas. Suddenly, the Irishman in the
back called out, “‘Give her a chorus of ‘Pistol Packin’
Momma’!’” 65 All of the men started singing the popular tune. The
Russians were stunned; they were unprepared for this new line of
attack. Suddenly, the officer in charge broke into a huge grin and
started laughing. She lowered her weapon and holstered it. Her
soldiers followed her lead and put their own guns away. The
atmosphere quickly changed from one charged with tension to one
of revelry. The Russians started celebrating and a quiet dinner
developed into a fully formed party.
As the party started to get into the swing of things, Bradley
noticed one of the female soldiers slip out the front door. She
returned moments later with one of the extra gas cans that were
stored on the backs of all jeeps. For the British and the Americans,
these tanks were for storing emergency gasoline. For the Russians,
they were for emergency vodka. Bradley had seen Russians getting
65
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drinks from these tanks and knew that they had contained a toxic
mix of gasoline and vodka that kept the Russians going but made
every other soldier ill. The girl put the tank down on a table.
Another girl saw the tank and poured herself two glasses. Seeing
Bradley, she made a beeline straight for him.
Bradley started to worry again. Not only did he rarely
drink, but when he did he certainly never ordered a cocktail of
vodka and gasoline. The girl tried offering him the drink several
times and each time he refused he got increasingly nervous.
Bradley never forgot that the Russians were often trigger happy
and that they were armed and he was not. After several tries, the
girl became frustrated and started yelling at him that he had
disrespected Mother Russia, Stalin, and all things Russian. At the
same time, she grabbed one of the submachine guns that one of her
comrades and brought in and began waving it at Bradley. She kept
threatening to shoot and he knew that she was more than capable
of it.
Suddenly, one of Bradley’s men ran up to them. He had
seen what was going on from across the room and thought he could
help defuse the tension. The man started talking rapidly to the girl
in Polish, trying to explain the situation. Bradley watched as her
expression changed from one of anger to one of confusion and then
she suddenly burst out laughing. Shaking her head, the soldier
wandered off, still laughing, to a knot of other Russian soldiers.
She started chatting with them and turned around to point at
Bradley several times. When she finished her story, they too burst
out laughing.
Confused and still a little worried, Bradley turned to the
other guy to ask what he had told the girl. Chuckling, the man
responded that he had told the soldier that Bradley was from a
crazy Baptist sect whose church forbade him from drinking
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anything other than water. Bradley started laughing at the absurdity
of it and the rest of the night passed without incident. 66
***
Several weeks later, their Polish guide led Bradley and the
rest of the group into yet another small town in the Polish
countryside. As they were trying to get their bearings, several
Russian soldiers emerged and surrounded the group. Bradley was
used to this and explaining that they were Americans,
Americanskys, and just wanted to return to their countrymen. 67 As
he prepared to deliver his speech, Bradley noticed that none of the
Russians had their guns pointed at the group. This in itself was
strange considering how all the way from Stalag III C to here any
Russian soldiers they had met had assumed the group was German
and only quick thinking and smooth talking had kept the group
from an early grave. For some reason though, these soldiers were
trying to get Bradley and his friends to follow them. This too was
abnormal as the Russians usually preferred to shoot onsite instead
of trying to relocate their victims. Although wary of some sort of
trick, Bradley knew that when angered, a Russian’s first instinct
was to shoot and Bradley certainly did not want that. He and the
others resignedly followed the soldiers. They were led to a large
compound with a train station at the center. At first, the men feared
that they had been brought to another POW camp. Sensing a trap,
Bradley and the others started to worry even more. However, an
interpreter was quickly brought over and explained to the
66
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bewildered group that this was a collection center. From here, the
men would take a train to Odessa and from there a ship would
return them to Allied lines.
Hardly believing that their ordeal was over, Bradley and the
others allowed themselves to be herded onto a flat car. The men
spent most of the trip believing that there had been a mistake and
that there was no way they were really headed home. Others feared
a German attack against the train and prepared to flatten
themselves on the ground to avoid gun fire and bombs. At one
point, the men even discussed the best way to jump from a train.
Wandering in the wilderness was preferable to getting shot or
recaptured for some of the men. Despite the various fears, the
worst enemy the men faced was the cold. The cars they rode were
meant for cargo and had not been designed for human passengers.
Consequently there was no insulation and the men huddled
together for warmth. However, soon even that was not enough and
they resorted to using plywood, tarpaulin or anything else they
could find as blankets. By the time they arrived at the next station,
the men looked more like a pile of garbage than actual human
beings.
Bradley and the others had been told they would need to
switch trains part of the way through their trip to Odessa. They
stopped in a small town and were moved to their next vehicle. The
new car they were loaded onto was absolutely gorgeous. It was the
first train that Bradley had been on since being captured that had
been designed and furnished with humans in mind. There were
large piles of fresh straw for the men to sleep on and a furnace in
the center of each car to help the men warm up. And, best of all,
none of the cars were overcrowded. Each only contained about
twenty or so men and Bradley knew from bitter experience that a
car such as this could hold far more than that. Everyone got their
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own space and were all able to spread out for a nice nap within the
car.
As the train neared Odessa, the temperature inside of the
car steadily dropped. Despite the heat created by the furnace, many
of the men started to feel the cold. Their car was not fully insulated
after all. When the train stopped and the doors opened, Bradley
saw the reason why. While they had been traveling, a snow storm
had blown into Odessa and worked itself into a blizzard. The snow
was falling fast and heavy, making it very difficult to see anything.
The men quickly gathered together and followed their Russian
guides away from the train station. Scared of getting separated
after making it this far, the men stayed within hands reach of each
other as they were led down the street to a large building. Heavily
armed Russians stood outside of the building and watched as the
former prisoners filed past. They were shown to a room where the
men were expected to sleep on the floor together. At this point,
Bradley and the others were used to this arrangement and quickly
drifted off.
The next morning, Bradley expected to be woken early for
roll call, but no such call came. Every day at Stalag III C had
begun with roll call and it felt strange to be back under guard and
not need to fall out. The men were left to their own devices until
after lunch when the Russians took them outside, still under guard,
to walk around several blocks for exercise before returning to the
compound. Walking around Odessa, Bradley saw the destruction
wrought by German fliers and saw the large piles of rubble that
used to be buildings. For a moment, Bradley flashed back to
Amiens and thought that he was expected to clear the area of
rubble. When he paused to look, it was a Russian voice yelling for
him to catch up, not a German one. Bradley had to remind himself
that he was looking at Russian buildings, not German ones and no
work was expected of him here. He quickly fell back in line. The
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guards stayed with the men all day and all night both to act as
protection and to ensure that the men could not leave. Negotiations
were underway with the Americans and the British and the
Russians did not want to lose their bargaining chips. Bradley and
the others had survived Stalag III C and a trek across Europe in
their pursuit for freedom. Now, they were stuck back under guard
by a foreign power without any control over their own lives.
Bradley and the others hoped that this really was the end of their
ordeal and not the start of a new chapter. 68
Eventually, the men were given the good news; a ship was
waiting in the harbor to take them back to their own lines.
Negotiations had broken down between the Russians and the
Americans, but the British, who also had former prisoners waiting
to be returned, had sent a man to negotiate their return. The British
were more successful than their American counterparts and the
Russians told their captives to expect to leave shortly after meeting
with the British representative. Bradley and the others were more
than excited to leave, as bombings on Odessa had picked up again
and they desperately wanted to escape before they became a part of
the rubble covering the city.
The next day, all of the men were marched from the
building they had been staying in and were brought down to the
docks. On their way there, they passed a large, gleaming ship. The
Russians told them, filled with pride, that that vessel was going to
take Premier Stalin to Yalta to meet with other officials. Next to
the Russian ship was the British liner that was to take the men
home. 69 Even though it was not as new nor as shiny, Bradley and
the others believed that their ship was more magnificent than
whatever vehicle Stalin chose to cross the Black Sea in.
68
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The trip itself was relatively uneventful and after more than
a day at sea, the ship finally docked at Naples, Italy. British
officers soon took charge of the men and checked them over. The
men were all interviewed and given medical exams and then fed.
During the exam, those with the worst medical cases were
immediately separated and flown to hospitals in the U.S. to give
them the best shot of surviving. The rest of the men were forced to
wait for a ship that would return them to America. The GIs took
advantage of the brief holiday and went off to explore Pompeii.
Bradley, however, could not join them because he had cut his foot
and it had become infected, making it very difficult to walk. He
instead spent several days in bed, resting up and taking medicine to
kill the infection. 70
Several days after their arrival in Naples, an American ship
arrived to take the men home. 71 Once aboard, the captain of the
ship spoke over the loud speaker and explained the situation to the
men. The ship would be sailing alone across the Atlantic alone and
would not be a part of a convoy. Many of the German U-boats that
normally would have threatened them had already been destroyed
by the Allies and those that still survived would not dare attack
such a large ship. Regardless, the captain was going to make the
run as fast as possible as this would also decrease the likelihood of
attack and would not stop for any men who fell overboard. The
ship would not be stopping for anything, so everyone that wanted
to return to the US had best stay on the ship. For the entire trip, the
men got nervous whenever the ship hit a wave, fearing that they
would be thrown overboard and abandoned in the ocean.
Eventually, the ship made it back to the United States, with
all of the men it had left Italy with, and everyone quickly
70
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disembarked. Bradley and the others were again loaded onto trains
and taken to various camps to be processed. Bradley ended up at
Fort Meade in Maryland where he was interviewed again, this time
by Americans, and then given a furlough to visit home. He took the
train into DC and got off at his usual stop. Walking down New
York Avenue to his boyhood home, Bradley felt isolated from all
of the people he passed. None of these people had watched people
get blown apart by both Allied and Axis bombs in Europe. They
would never know the joy of winning the meat lottery and finding
that one scrap of meat at the bottom of their stew in the middle of
Germany. And, Bradley was fairly certain, none of these people
had ever been threatened with a machine gun for not drinking a
vodka and gasoline cocktail. In short, none of these people had his
war experiences, and although he could spend the rest of his life
trying to explain it to them, they would never truly understand
what he had gone through. 72 Nothing could accurately convey all
of his experiences to these strangers and no matter how hard he
tried, a gap would always exist between him and civilians. For the
rest of his life, Bradley tried to bridge this gap by talking and
writing about his experiences. He published multiple books filled
with his writings and poems through which he tried to convey all
that he had seen, heard, smelled, touched and tasted. Short of
bringing people back in time with him, this was the closest that
Bradley could get people to what he experienced and Bradley was
determined to share all that he knew. 73
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From Crusaders to Flunkies: American
Newspaper Coverage of Black First World
War Veterans in American Newspapers
between 1915 and 1930
By
Matthew LaRoche
~♦~
“War is teaching us that we are inseparably linked together
here in America,” said Dr. Robert Moton of the Tuskegee Institute,
in 1918. “The test of our greatness as a nation is not in the
accumulation of wealth, nor in the development of a culture
merely. The great test is for the fortunate to reach down and help
the less highly favored, the poor, the humble—yes, the black. My
race… simply asks an equal chance on equal terms with other
Americans.” 1 Black Americans met that test admirably. They bled
in opposition to aggressive nations on the Western Front.
However, after American newspapers released a slew of
encouraging pieces—patriotic war propaganda aimed at
convincing black Americans to bleed for President Wilson’s great
democratic crusade—the nation and the news quickly forgot the
inherent promise in letting black soldiers serve: service must equal
citizenship in all its forms. However, with the war won,
newspapers no longer championed the capability of and dues due
to all black Americans. Less than a decade after the United States
entered the First World War, the nation returned to a comfortable
1
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racial status quo that saw blacks as fit to serve, but not to stand
shoulder to shoulder with their white comrades in matters of
respect, remembrance, and remuneration. The great, resurrected
hope in a worldwide democracy, led by an America that proudly
brandished equality on the home front as her sacred sword, was
betrayed with silence.
As Nina Mjagkij chronicles in Loyalty in Times of Trial:
The African-American Experience During World War One,
throughout the mobilization of the United States leading up to
1917, the black community largely held three distinct views of
their place in the World War. One faction, headed by W. E. B. Du
Bois and others, including Robert Moton, imagined that the
selfless sacrifice of black lives at the front would force a crisis of
conscience across America, that at long last, whites would extend
the blessings of liberty to their black countrymen. 2 The second
group, disillusioned after decades of Jim Crowe despotism, saw
little of benefit in Wilson’s hypocritical proclamations of a war to
defend and spread democracy worldwide. 3 Put simply, if
Wilsonian democracy abroad looked the same as democracy at
home, nothing substantial would be gained by their deaths.
However, the third and perhaps largest group neither dared to
hope, nor outright condemned the war—they could only eye
developments warily from the sidelines. 4 Even with the advent of
the universal draft for eligible males in May of 1917, supporters of
black involvement in the war had to quickly undo centuries of bad
blood between black Americans and the reality of America as they

2

Nina Mjagkij, Loyalty in Time of Trial: The African-American
Experience During World War I, (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2011), XIX.
3
Ibid., xx.
4
Ibid.

~ 90 ~

had suffered it. 5 In order to call them to the colors, encouragement
of all kinds appeared in the public sphere. Perhaps the most widely
distributed and noticed encouragements appeared in American
newspapers and, largely speaking, in specifically black
publications.
Between 1915 and mid-1919, newspaper representations of
black soldiers, their accomplishments and those of their
predecessors are fairly positive. 6 For example, in August of 1915
the Cleveland Gazette, a black newspaper from Ohio, ran the story
of two colored sailors in the war of 1812. John Thompson lost his
legs—and his life—aboard a privateer, allegedly shouting “Fire
away, boys! Nebber haul de colors down!” 7 as he passed. Aboard
the same warship, John Davis “begged that he might be thrown
overboard immediately, lest his mangled remains encumber the
working of the guns.” 8 An Ohio newspaper choosing to resurrect
the story of a few long dead black sailors does seem somewhat out
5
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of place, and perhaps even facetious. However, the article speaks
with the utmost respect throughout, suggesting that it numbered
among the first publications of an entirely new strain of black
journalism, one set on resurrecting the will of black men to fight
by extolling the successes of their ancestors.
However, the anti-war faction within the black press
countered these encouragements by dramatically covering the
ways in which the military actively used its black servicemen as
fodder. For example, the Topeka Plaindealer, another black paper,
bristled in reaction to the fighting on the Mexican border in June of
1916. The headline left little room for ambiguity: “In Mexico the
Colored Boys are Chucked in Front of Enemy Bullets so that Some
White Might Gain the Honor and Obtain Promotion!” 9 Others in
the newspaper business condemned the military less vehemently.
This third faction utilized language that acknowledged the
injustices suffered by black troops, but still clearly aspired to full
respect and citizenship. A day after the Plaindealer covered the
fighting in Mexico, another black paper, the Freeman, asked that
“colored Americans hold memorial meetings in honor of the
colored cavalrymen who were sacrificed in Mexico and died
bravely fighting for the flag, which does not protect them at
home.” 10 The Freeman did not present the abuses on the southern
border as symptomatic of an unassailable racial divide—as
injustices that would have no solution except for, presumably,
separation from the United States, and a total rejection of its
hypocritical claims to liberty and equality. Rather, the Freeman
made an intentional effort to utilize the language of patriotism as a
means of shaming the military for not upholding the very standards
9
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of liberty and equality it claimed to protect. They sought to correct
the injustice by drawing wide attention to its inherent
contradictions. Whether any of these efforts were particularly
successful is unclear. But they do suggest that a lively skepticism
posed a real challenge to the pro-war sections of the black press.
Still, pro-war media had other strategies for countering this
skepticism. For one, they ran hopeful op-eds that promised black
contributions to the allied war effort would be acknowledged and
rewarded by war’s end. Their first cause for optimism came with
the widespread use of colonial troops in the French and British
armies. The Western Outlook, a black press out of Oakland,
California, ran a piece in 1915 assuring its readers that,
“employment of colored soldiers upon the continent of Europe
deals a shattering blow to race prejudice. After the war is over, the
position of the dark people in the political economy in Greater
Britain and Greater France will never be the same as it was before
the conflict.” 11 However, this inducement came with a massive
drawback—it would only be proven right or wrong at war’s end.
More persuasive were the incentives that offered immediate
payoffs, so pro-war publications naturally stressed these as much
as possible.
For example, the Savannah Tribune, another black paper,
published the letter of a “Satisfied Colored Soldier” in February of
1918, advertising service as a path to good food and travel. 12
Drawing upon a letter that Private Henry Perry’s mother had just
received, the Tribune described army life in beyond idyllic terms.
It brought “news that her son is doing splendid… enjoying life and
11

“The War and the Colored Races,” Western Outlook, May 29,
1915.
12
“Letter Received from a Satisfied Colored Soldier,” Savannah
Tribune, February 23, 1918.

~ 93 ~

getting good pay for his services,” to the tune of sending home
twenty-five dollars a month. 13 Indeed, Perry wrote that the army,
“give[s] me everything I need. We get plenty to eat. Get up every
morning at 5:30 and go to bet [sic] at 9. This is healthy and I like
it.” 14 And if the lifestyle and paying work failed to entice black
men to enlist, the Tribune added comments that applied social
pressure to their young black male readers. They seized upon
Perry’s passing comment that he felt fortunate to work alongside
“lots of colored boys and men.” 15 The Tribune turned this personal
opinion into a subtle shaming device, writing that letters like
Perry’s had already “caused many others at home to enlist.” 16 But
perhaps this article’s most surreptitious tactic was its attempt to
convince readers that Perry’s experiences were that of a standard,
black Doughboy. By giving no details as to the work Perry found
himself doing, the Tribune deemphasized the fact that Perry was a
member of “Stevedore Regiment 303, at Newport News, VA,” and
as such was relegated to dock work. 17 A casual reader might be
drawn in by the reports of travel, pay, and camaraderie, might skip
past the word “stevedore,” and forget the indignity of being
consigned to manual labor until he had already signed enlistment
papers.
By mid-1917, with the U.S. finally in the war, it was too
late for many black men to debate the pros and cons of service. By
May 18th, the Selective Service Act had been passed, and hundreds
of thousands of African-Americans dutifully registered for the
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draft. 18 They suffered overt discrimination from military
authorities. Draft board officials tore off the lower left-hand corner
of black registrant’s forms to better mark them out for segregated
units. 19 Naval policy relegated African-Americans to menial roles,
and the Marine Corps barred them entirely. 20 Worse, after the
Houston Riot in August of 1917 saw armed black soldiers scuffling
with aggressive, local whites, the military doubled down on its
estimation that black soldiers were more a liability than an
advantage. 21 For the rest of the war, the majority of AfricanAmerican servicemen would work logistics and construction
jobs—only two units, the 92nd and 93rd infantry divisions, ever saw
combat. 22
Despite these ill omens, pro-war papers continued to
publish and republish assurances that victory in Europe would lead
to a proper appreciation of blacks at home. But none, perhaps,
summed up the black community’s lingering hope as they endured
the First World War than a Mr. William T. Fergusson of
Washington, D.C. As a man well past the age of eligibility for the
draft, Mr. Fergusson nonetheless wanted to be seen doing his part
to defeat “an enemy whose success means a slavery many times
worse than the one from which Lincoln emancipated us.” 23 He
wrote to the Washington Bee with a different approach in mind
than most—something which the pro-war papers may not have
18
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fully anticipated, but surely welcomed. As he saw it, “We have
given our men and our money to help the cause of democracy.
Now, let us… enlist in that cause for which we can fight—
producing bigger crops.” 24 Viewing this as a natural way for
civilians to keep faith with their sons, fathers, and brothers
overseas, Fergusson threw his heart into his plea. However, his
zeal and optimism took a surprising turn as he fully embraced the
tenets of the pro-war faction. He chides his fellow black civilians
who have yet to find ways to support the war effort from home,
“the rewards for being a patriotic citizen is a thousandfold greater
than a few dollars ready cash.” 25 But he rounds out his plea with a
resounding faith that “When the war is over, and various men are
called to the White House to be congratulated… some colored man
will be among the number.” 26 And not only will he be invited and
recognized, but President Wilson “will say: Well done, faithful
American. Enter thou into the joys of democracy.” 27
Mr. Fergusson could hardly have been more wrong. While
black soldiers served with extreme distinction, one of the first acts
by the U.S. military in the post-war environment was to exclude
blacks from officially partaking in the fruits of victory. 28 As the
triumphal Allies in all their diversity, “the British and their
colonial servicemen, the Italians, the Japanese, the Portuguese, and
others,” 29 passed under the Arc de Triomphe, the American
soldiers displayed were decidedly monochromatic
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“By the time of the victory parade, the Ninetysecond and Ninety-third divisions had been hastily
shipped home, leaving no black combat troops in
France. Thousands of black stevedores, pioneer
infantrymen, and other service troops still remained
for Pershing to include in the representative
assemblage of American’s forces…. The
marginalization of African American troops spoke
volumes to how Woodrow Wilson, the War
Department, and much of white America envisioned
a similarly Jim Crowed historical memory of the
war and black participation in it.” 30
From the first moment of the cease-fire, white Americans began
the work of returning black soldiers to civilian life, to another strict
racial hierarchy that would not afford them any kindness based on
their sacrifices. They were to accept that, as a white speaker in
New Orleans said, “you are going to be treated exactly like you
were before the war; this is a white man’s country and we expect
to rule it.” 31 American newspapers watched the enforcement of this
home order throughout the demobilization period of 1919, when
outbursts of violence throughout that “Red Summer,”
disproportionately targeted returning black veterans. 32 While
papers typically denounced the violence, few made the black
soldier their main concern.
This attitude is not surprising, considering that only for a
brief period in 1918 did white newspapers take a positive interest
30
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in the accomplishments of black soldiers in France. For the
majority of the war, black servicemen were functionally invisible.
However, in May of 1918, the Grand Forks Herald cited “a
notable instance of bravery and devotion by two soldiers of an
American colored regiment operating in a French sector.” 33 In a
remarkable act of soldiering, Private Henry Johnson and Private
Roberts “continued fighting after receiving wounds and despite the
use of grenades by a superior force. They should be given credit
for preventing, by their bravery, the capture of any of our men.” 34
The Fort Wayne News Sentinel echoed this as the “best story, so
far, of the valor of Americans on the battlefields of France.” 35 The
Duluth News Tribune concurred, and even took this event as proof
positive of “a spirit of democracy which knows no race nor
color.” 36 However, this enthusiasm for rallying around universal
democracy was short-lived, both in the headlines and in the
national sentiment. As soon as there was no more news of heroic
deeds coming from the front, fault lines quickly reemerged
between the white public and the returning black veteran.
Most notably, perhaps, was the coverage given to promises
of war risk insurance for black soldiers and their families, and to
provide hospitals for black as well as white veterans in need of
long-term care. In December of 1917, with the war far from
decided, the Savannah Tribune published an article relaying
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker’s desire to overcome the
“many difficulties” of mobilizing blacks for war while taking “the
33
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peculiar southern situation,” namely the explosive bigotry
unleashed whenever southern whites encountered blacks in
uniform, into account.” 37 Reporting, in full, an official statement
by the Secretary of War, they distributed proof of his promise that
at war’s end, “all will be alike entitled to the gratitude of their
country”—or, as the paper put it, that the “Negro Must Get [a]
Square Deal.” 38 In March of 1918, the Tribune announced that the
Secretary of War had unveiled legislation “provided by the
Government for the protection of the soldier and his family, in
addition to the soldier’s monthly allotment and in addition to the
Government’s compensation for the soldier’s death or disability.” 39
Such insurance was surely badly needed after the war had claimed
or crippled many black soldiers, leaving many veterans and
families short on income.
However, regardless of Baker’s attempts to remunerate
black war veterans as he would white veterans, by 1920 the
Savannah Tribune had declared him guilty of blatantly
discriminating against the future black servicemen of the post-war
army. Citing military policy
“to assign national guard units recruited from
colored men to duty that will not incorporate them
in a division composed of white organizations…. it
has been decided that colored troops… shall be
organized into pioneer infantry units that can be
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assigned to duty under command of corps
headquarters.” 40
He cites “considerations bearing upon military efficiency” 41 as the
sole reason behind relegating all black servicemen to labor
battalions in the future. However, as the Tribune notes, the absence
of any other minorities from exclusive service in the “drudgery
corps” makes it clear that any lack of efficiency surrounding black
troops, in light of their established competence in combat, must
come from white discrimination. 42 Baker seemed unwilling to
rescind his position on the issue, considering it born of solid,
“dispassionate thought.” 43
Even more blatantly biased policy neglected the needs of
black victims of shell-shock, gas, and other lingering wounds. The
Washington Bee reported in 1921 on the decision by the Alabama
Chamber of Commerce to stonewall the construction of two
hospitals in Montgomery for colored Great War veterans, “one for
tubercular and one for shell-shocked soldiers.” 44According to the
Bee, “the board, unaware at first that the hospitals were for
Colored Americans made every effort to secure them through
Congressman J. R. Tyson.” 45 Unsurprisingly, as soon as “Tyson
informed the board that the two hospitals were for Colored
soldiers,” the board “emphatically and unanimously rejected the
idea.” 46 Blistering at the injustice of the decision, the Bee protested
40
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the horror that black soldiers were left “alive but in such a
condition that they are not able to take advantage of the
opportunities in life. They must now take as their reward such
conditions that are now facing them.” 47 Sadly, except for
independent philanthropy, there were few ways to overcome such
vindictive obstacles placed before the black veteran.
Similarly, dissenting media as a whole seemingly found it
difficult to shout above the comfortable silence that the nation
wrapped itself in. It seems that black soldiers had become a
liability—a nuisance, even—as their existence clashed with the
national desire for a “Jim Crowed” memory, as Chad L. Williams
recounts. 48 After 1920, even the Savannah Tribune focuses almost
solely on the economic effects of the war on black workers, not
soldiers, with the exception of a 1921 article on, again, Captain
Needham Roberts, “one of the two Negro soldiers of the New York
15th who had the distinction of being the first American soldiers to
be decorated in France.” 49 By 1927, only one rather unsettling
article on black soldiers, from the Topeka Plaindealer, appears,
one that encapsulates how little had come of black hopes in the
Great War.
Whether or not the posting was strictly racially motivated
or not, the condition of the 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (Colored)
as of August 1927 offers a further poignant visage of the black
soldier, so successful in war, losing the peace and returning to his
“proper” place in American society. A decade after the U.S.’s
47

Ibid.
Torchbearers of Democracy, p. 300.
49
“Great Negro Hero of World War,” Savannah Tribune, August
4, 1921. The other two articles from 1921 on that pertain to the war
at all are “The Coming of War Meant New Day for Negro Labor,”
Feb. 5, 1921 and “Negro Workers During the World War,” March
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entry into the First World War, as “Uncle Sam’s only cavalry
division” marched out of Ft. Bliss, E Troop of the “famous 10th
Cavalry Colored” regiment left Ft. Huachua to escort them en
route.” 50 By “escort” the Army meant “look after [dignitaries and
military officials], care for their horses, etc.” After yet again
answering the call of their country—and, indeed, of the budding
Free World—colored soldiers of the United States were still
singled out for use as “flunkies,” as manservants and horse
handlers. 51 Serving in segregated units, and serving as literal
servants was customary long after the sacrifices of the Argonne
Forest, to say nothing of Yorktown, New Orleans, or Ft. Wagner.
American newspapers apparently saw nothing to criticize in
that; the headlines stayed silent on the matter, even amongst black
newspapers. By 1927, the black soldier had again been reduced to
a caricature, something that could be “famous” while still
consigned to holding horses for white superiors, be they officers or
rank-and-file soldiers. 52 While the war was afoot, this caricature
was arguably manipulated and romanticized for propaganda
purposes, as with the tale of privates Johnson and Roberts. Those
taken in by the image of a son of slaves liberating the downtrodden
of France and Belgium seemingly ignored the hypocrisy of
returning such a man to Jim Crow and further decades of socially
abided racial violence. With the peace, the names of colored
soldiers on monuments across France were left to molder on the
edge of national memory, sustained by fewer and fewer voices
with each passing year. Even the tradition of dissent set forth by a
core of black newspapers could not sustain the outcry for
50

“Colored Troop Attend Cavalry Division Maneuvers—As
Flunkies,” Topeka Plaindealer, August 30, 1927.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.

~ 102 ~

recognition. The promise of citizenship, although written with
blood, was thought certain to invigorate the black “menace of
degeneracy” in countless imagined forms. 53 For most, the
uncertainty of equality was too dangerous for interwar America to
deliver—so America did not deliver.
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Helpers in a “Heathen” Land?: an
Examination of Missionary Perceptions of
the Cherokees
By
Andrew Nosti
~♦~
Introduction
From the earliest contact between Europeans and
Indigenous Americans, traces of cultural conversion and coercion
underpinned the emerging interactions. These cultural pressures
often materialized through religion, chiefly Christianity. As the
“white man’s burden” of bringing what they considered
civilization to the newfound lands pervaded the public conscience,
spreaders of the gospel permeated Indigenous American
communities. A special relationship between Christian
missionaries and Native peoples developed, often serving as the
first and sometimes only forms of interracial interaction.
Following their revolutionary victory, America’s first wave
of officials had a challenge to confront: how to handle the Native
tribes within and around American-claimed lands. The initial
conquered lands approach soon gave way to Secretary of War
Henry Knox’s civilization program. This directive, begun during
George Washington’s presidency, established Native tribes as
sovereign nations while simultaneously working towards their
eventual assimilation into the dominant American culture. Knox
and Washington, like most leaders of their day, viewed the Natives
as uncivilized, which meant living and functioning under non-
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Euro-American standards and mores. As these officials depicted
the Indigenous inferiority as cultural instead of racial, they pursued
a process through which the Native people would gain the
intellectual, moral, and physical tools required for their
acculturation. The early American government quickly endorsed
Christianization as integral to this acculturation process. 1
As missionaries sought out distant lands to transform tribal
peoples, the U.S. experienced a transformation of its own in the
Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century. This
religious revolution formed a new frontier of American
Christianity. Doctrines of self-improvement and revivalist
reformation replaced stricter Calvinistic teachings of preordination.
New forms of socio-religious egalitarianism undermined past
religious hierarchies, especially in New England parishes only
recently adjusted to the effects of the First Great Awakening of the
mid-eighteenth century. These undercurrents sent shockwaves
through the American populace and catalyzed a number of reform
efforts. The combination of democratic egalitarianism and zealous
self-improvement energized an individualistic approach that
focused on changing society one person at a time, viewing the
body politic as an atomized collective only alterable from the atom
up. 2
The Second Great Awakening had perhaps its greatest
effect on religious institutions and efforts themselves. These
effects extended beyond pulpits and congregations to missionary
causes. Sometimes already structurally in place due to previous
outreach and the federal government’s civilization program, the
1
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Second Great Awakening’s religious revivalism revitalized the
missionary cause. A new generation of preachers swelled the
missionary ranks and descended upon tribal peoples, bringing their
gospel fervor to the “heathen” lands. As the atomized conceptions
of self- and societal reform combined with the doctrine of
Millenialism, which demanded faith across all people to usher in
the holy millennium prophesied in scripture, many believers turned
to the Indigenous Americans to prove their worth, craft a better
society, and swell the ranks of the devout. 3
While all missionaries provide a profound insight into early
American perceptions of their Native neighbors, the missionaries
to the Cherokees prove remarkable and worthy of special attention
for a variety of reasons. These missionaries came from diverse
backgrounds and held diverse beliefs. Some followed
Congregationalist doctrines; others Methodist, Baptist, or
Moravian. Many came from New England; others Tennessee,
North Carolina, or elsewhere. By the time of removal,
Congregationalists had established nine mission stations in the
Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia regions of the Cherokee Nation
and sent thirty-five ministers, school teachers, and artisans to these
outposts; the Moravians boasted two mission stations in Cherokee
Georgia; the Methodists had eight circuit-riding missionaries; and
3

For more about the causes and propagation of the Second Great Awakening,
see Donald G. Mathews, “The Second Great Awakening as an Organizing
Process, 1780-1830: An Hypothesis,” American Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1
(Spring, 1969): 23-43. For more on the effects of the Second Great Awakening,
see Louis P. Masur, “Religion and Politics,” 1831: Year of Eclipse (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2001), 63-114; and Richard D. Shiels, “The Scope of the Second
Great Awakening: Andover, Massachusetts, as a Case Study,” Journal of the
Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 2, Religion in the Early Republic (Summer, 1985):
223-246. To see how missionary-like effects affected other portions of the
United States during the Second Great Awakening, turn to Carol Sherif, “The
Perils of Progress,” The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of
Progress, 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 138-171.
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the Baptists had sent a total of nine missionaries, teachers, and
artisans. 4
The fact that they worked with and lived among the
Cherokees gives them a prominent position within the history of
American-Indian affairs. The Cherokees held a special place in the
minds of white Americans. They had long attempted to adopt the
norms of white society and, subsequently, gained the moniker the
“most civilized tribe” in America. The missionaries’ arrival in the
1810s, 20s, and 30s occurred during a pivotal era for the Cherokee
Nation. Always attempting to halt the approach of the white man
onto their lands, the Cherokees faced a crisis in the 1820s and 30s
when Georgia and, beginning in 1829, the federal government
demanded they relinquish their homelands to the state and
encroaching settlers. The missionaries continued to live among the
Cherokees throughout this period, and, consequently, through
extant letters, diaries, and journals, they provide a crucial source of
information for decoding the complex conceptions surrounding the
Cherokees and Native Americans that pervaded the white psyche
in the Early Republic. An examination of such documents
complicates traditional, bifurcated understandings of helper and
harmer in relation to Native Americans.
Civilized vs Savage
Before deciphering the missionaries’ conceptions, one must first
define and decode the language they employed in their discussions
of the Cherokees. When Revered Cyrus Kingsbury marched from
Boston to what is now Chattanooga, Tennessee, in January 1817,
to establish the Brainerd School on behalf of the American Board
4
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of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) – the
Congregationalist missionary organization – he framed his
impending work in the same binary context of civilization and
wilderness, civilized and savage, that white Americans had applied
to Indigenous Americans for centuries. On March 4, 1817,
Kingsbury noted the enthusiasm among the missionaries over “the
great and good work of building the cause of the Redeemer in this
Heathen land.” Two days later, Kingsbury penned, “Here for the
first time I beheld the dear sisters who are devoted to the arduous
work of civilizing and converting the savages of our wilderness.” 5
In January 1818, Ard Hoyt, another ABCFM missionary,
commented, “It is truly painful to see the ignorance of these
people…in several instances when first speaking with them on the
most solemn and momentous subjects, they would laugh like
[mere?] idiots.” 6 As displayed by Kingsbury’s and Hoyt’s entries,
missionaries, and others, constantly incorporated words such as
heathen, savage, ignorant, and wilderness (or wild) in discussions
of Native Americans. The strikethrough of “like [mere?] idiots”
suggests that Hoyt may have reconsidered the original inclusion of
such condescension, but its original insertion says more than his
change of mind.
Other words and phrases, such as darkness, similarly coated
their language. When facing the loss of Catharine Brown, a student
whose model example would gain her fame and turn her memory
into a partially fictionalized figure, because of her family’s western
emigration, Ard Hoyt lamented, “Precious babe in Christ! a few
months ago brought out of the dark wilderness; here illuminated by
the word & spirit of God, & now to be sent back to the dark &
5

Cyrus Kingsbury, March 4 and March 6, 1817, entries in The Brainerd
Journal: A Mission to the Cherokees, 1817-1823, eds. Joyce B. Phillips and Paul
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6
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chilling shades of the forest.” 7 The constructed dichotomies
became almost Biblical: a confrontation between light and dark.
This cultural lexicon functioned as much more than a
conglomeration of abstractions; concrete notions grounded words
such as heathen, savage, civilization, ignorant, and darkness in
clearly defined ways. A host of long-standing standards combined
to make a person or a people civilized or savage, and, in order to
understand the missionaries’ perceptions of Native Americans, we
must first understand these concrete qualifications.
One of the first requirements for “civilization” was a
Lockean approach to economic living. As Roy Harvey Pearce
explained in his work Savagism and Civilization:
This is agrarian idealism, the belief that men,
having a natural right to their land by occupation
and labor, achieve status and dignity by exercising
that right and becoming freeholding farmers…. For
Locke—and virtually all Americans were, in the
most general sense, Lockeans—man achieved his
highest humanity by taking something out of nature
and converting it with his labor into part of himself.
His private property, conceived of in terms of the
close, personal relationships of an agrarian society,
was his means to social maturity.” 8
Thomas Jefferson echoed this ideology in his Notes on the State of
Virginia: “Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of
7
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God, if ever He had a chosen people. Whose breasts he has made
his particular deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.” 9 When
whites first encountered Native Americans, the indigenous peoples
had no conception of land ownership or the linear territoriality that
caused Europeans to divvy up and fence off land. Over time,
American Indians developed a sense of land ownership, but it
functioned as a communal commodity for the public good as
opposed to a privatized parcel. Most Europeans and then
Americans – and, therefore, the missionaries – viewed these clear
set private boundaries as requirements for civilization, leading to
what Jeremiah Evarts terms the “controversies about
unappropriated lands,” or the discussions during the Early
Republic over whether Indigenous Americans had a rightful claim
to lands they did not separate and cultivate or whether state
governments controlled such lands. 10

9
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This cultivation requirement and agrarian ideal caused
agriculture to take precedence in American conceptions of
civilization. Since Americans almost universally viewed their
native neighbors as savages, they also largely believed Native
Americans subsisted off of the “hunt,” despite apparent
agricultural tendencies within all eastern American Indians. 11
These misconceptions led white Americans to endorse the
proliferation of agricultural practices among the tribes. This effort
manifested in the 1791 Treaty of Hopewell between the federal
government and the Cherokees, stating, “That the Cherokee nation
may be led to a greater degree of civilization, and to become
herdsmen and cultivators, instead of remaining in a state of
hunters, the United States will, from time to time, furnish
gratuitously the said nation with useful implements of
husbandry.” 12 Missionaries followed this example when among the
Cherokees. At Springplace Mission, a mission nestled into the
Appalachian Mountains along the border of Tennessee and
Georgia, the Moravians set up orderly orchards to teach Cherokees
agricultural methods. 13 The missionaries at Brainerd displayed a
constant anxiety over what they considered the hunter state of the
supposedly ignorant Cherokees and did all they could to eradicate
11
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this perceived way of life. When first establishing the Brainerd
school, Reverend Kingsbury explained his hopes that “we may be
instrumental of putting them in a way to obtain an abundance of
bread, & all other necessaries of life, by teaching them & their
children to cultivate the earth.” 14 Over a year later, when a twentyfour-year-old Cherokee applied to live at their school, the Brainerd
missionaries marked his “rambling li[f]e” and how he “obtained
his living by hunting.” They went on to tell him “hunting could not
be permitted, but we would put him in a better way to purchase
clothes, viz., that we would employ him to labor with our men in
the field a sufficient time to buy his necessary clothing.” 15 This
value system of agricultural labor caused the characterization of
“industrious” to become one of the most highly regarded traits
among the students.
Connected to the view of the hunter state came an
evaluation of backwards gender dynamics among the Cherokees.
In the traditional Cherokee way of life, men typically hunted while
women farmed. The rigidity of these gender roles broke down
slightly when men assisted with clearing fields and planting crops
and women dressed and tanned deerskins, but generally these
separated roles defined Cherokee gender dynamics. At the same
time, the Cherokees lived under matrilineal and matricentric
societal and cultural structures, a dichotomous opposition to the
patriarchal Euro-American society. 16 Since white Americans and
Christian missionaries presumed the inferiority of the hunter state
and associated masculinity with agricultural manual labor, public
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leadership, and the head of house, a clear effort was made to
redefine Cherokee gender roles.
As Barbara Welter lays out in her essay “The Cult of True
Womanhood,” America experienced a firm tightening of gender
roles at the same time as missionaries ventured to Cherokee land.
These evolving gender roles created two distinct spheres for men
and women: men would operate in the public sphere, working and
bringing home the means to survive, while women would operate
within the private sphere of the home, cultivating a domain of
comfort for her wearied husband. 17 These sentiments rang true for
the missionaries, displayed by Hoyt’s assertion that “our dear
sisters at the north would gladly take part with their sisters here in
the labor of making clothes for these naked sons of the forest.” 18
The acculturation of these emerging, or tightening, gender
dynamics would force Cherokee women into the home and
Cherokee men into the fields. To accomplish this, missionaries
taught women how to cook, spin, weave, sew, and mend, as well as
make butter, cheese, soap, and candles, while they taught men how
to prepare lands and plant and harvest crops. William G.
McLoughlin summed up this effort in his essay “Two Bostonian
Missionaries”: “The Board [ABCFM] used the mission farm to
teach young Indian boys how to become farmers; missionary wives
educated young Cherokees girls to become farmers’ wives.” 19 The
missionary drive to separate boys and girls in order to demarcate
their separately defined roles caused the Brainerd missionaries to
flirt with the idea of establishing a separate school for girl pupils,

17
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with male missionaries teaching the boys and female missionaries
the girls. 20
The attempted application of patriarchal gender roles
extended into missionary efforts to reform Cherokee marriage
practices. Cherokee marriage practices had long included
polygamy, specifically sororal or intra-familial polygamy where a
man would marry a set of sisters. No laws bound husbands to their
wives, so when a husband grew upset with his wife he would
sometimes simply leave the household and live with his relatives
until he married again and moved in with his new wife, still
technically married to his previous one(s). 21 This practice often
shocked missionaries. When Anna Rosina of the Moravian
Springplace mission encountered John Rogers, a Cherokee, she
noted “Mr. Rogers’s two women, namely a mother and her
daughter! [author’s emphasis].” 22 This small notation conveys
both the utter surprise, and judgment, in regards to Mr. Rogers’s
union with both a woman and her daughter and the missionaries’
perceptions of marriage as a form of property ownership – “Mr.
Rogers’s two women.” Missionaries worked hard to explain the
flaws and sin of polygamy and to institute the “correct” form of
marriage within the Cherokee nation. When one polygamous
relationship led to complications with one Cherokee man’s
20

One missionary, a Father Gambold, “who has resided as a teacher, more than
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children’s enrollment at the Brainerd school, Hoyt wrote, “How
much better for this man & his children if he had adhered to the
original institutions of marriage; few, however, of the natives pay
attention to it.” 23 The missionaries work to propagate their
“original institutions of marriage” and ensure such complications
would not happen again.
Similar to the social institution of marriage, Americans also
attempted to enforce white governmental institutions on the
Cherokees, believing these the best means to attain and maintain
civilization. Cherokee society had long functioned under the
structures of clan and kinship. Seven clans banded together to
make the Cherokee nation, and blood ties rooted in shared ancestry
held the clans together. 24 A combination of clan ties and adherence
to a faith in cosmic harmony created an effective societal structure
of clan governance. As Theda Perdue outlines in her introduction
to The Cherokee Removal, “The obligation of clan members were
[sic] so strong and so scrupulously fulfilled that the Cherokees had
no need for a police force or court system: Protection, restitution,
and retribution came from the clan.” 25 Many Americans, including
the missionaries, mistook the clan forms of governance and blood
retaliation as anarchy and barbarism, and thus pressure caused the
National Council to outlaw blood retaliation in favor of the Nation
to resolve future injuries and disputes through legal meams. 26 This
same process caused an increasing centralization of power and,
subsequently, more rigid social hierarchy within the Nation. Over
time, the National Council, developing into an elite body made up
of wealthy, English-literate, Christian Cherokees of partial white
ancestry, instituted a number of laws that dissuaded polygamy,
23
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transitioned away from the matrilineal genealogy, and generally
promoted a restructuring of the broader social order. These
pressures eventually compelled the National Council to adopt a
constitution in 1827 modelled on the American republican system,
replete with a bicameral legislature and judicial system. 27
Christianity
Americans and, perhaps even more so, missionaries combined
Christianity and civilization; civilizing and converting went hand
in hand. As displayed in the Kingsbury quote above, Kingsbury
places the “arduous work of civilizing and converting the savages
of our wilderness” in the same train of thought. 28 The fervor of the
Second Great Awakening and its resulting Millenialism and
revivalism caused an even greater emphasis on conversion among
Native Americans in the early nineteenth century. Missionaries
disagreed as to the process of Christianization; Congregationalists
favored a stricter, more hierarchical and local approach while
Baptists and Methodists preferred a more itinerant, egalitarian, and
open one. They also sometimes disagreed as to the steps within
that process – whether Christianization directly meant civilization,
whether civilization should precede Christianization, and vice
versa. They did all, however, agree on one thing: the absolute
necessity of Christianity for a civilized society. As McLoughlin
puts it, this meant that “To Christianize was to Americanize.” 29
Despite assertions by missionaries and other Americans,
the Cherokees had long had religious and spiritual practices. They
held a spiritual sense of cosmic harmony, a balance of the universe
27

For more on the background to the Constitution and the Constitution itself, see
Perdue, “The Cherokee Constitution of 1827,” The Cherokee Removal, 58-70.
28
Kingsbury, March 6, 1817, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 31.
29
McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 38, 63-69.

~ 120 ~

that held everything together. Ancestry and ancestral lands
contained spiritual significance for the Cherokees. They also had a
ritualistic belief system that included ceremonial events, such as
rain dances. Beyond these views and practices, they did have some
beliefs akin to Christian theology. One such similarity came
through their origin story, which consisted of a deity figure
creating life, potentially in a seven day cycle and out of clay, and
told the story of the first man and woman and an eventual fall of
humanity. 30
Despite the rather clear presence of spiritual and/or
religious beliefs and practices among the people, some
missionaries depicted the Cherokees as completely areligious. In
April of 1818, Hoyt wrote
There is nothing among this people to oppose the
gospel, except their ignorance & the depravity of
the human heart. They have not, as is the case with
most heathen nations, a system of false religion,
handed down from their fathers, which must be
overturned in order to make way for the Gospel.
They are rather, as the Prophet foretold the children
of Israel would be, ‘Without sacrifice, & without an
image, & without an ephod, & without a
teraphim.’ 31

30

For more information on the Cherokee Origin stories and missionary
understandings of them, see Moravian Springplace, 106-110. For more
information on rainmaking practices, see pages 84 to 86 of the same work.
31
Hoyt, April 9, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 51-52. The use of
“handed down from their fathers” demonstrates the patricentric mindset of the
missionaries. As opposed to the exclusively male clergy of the missionaries,
Cherokee women actually passed down the oral traditions that would contain the
Cherokee spiritual or religious narratives.
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Roughly three and a half months later, Hoyt noted a conversation
the missionaries had with a band of visiting Cherokees in which
the visitors expressed “they had no expectation of any thing after
death.” Apparently, these Cherokees “seldom or never bestowed
any thoughts on these things . . . they were not conscious of ever
having done, said, or thought any thing that was wrong or sinful.”
Hoyt concluded that “they appeared as stupid, ignorant &
unconcerned as the hearts that perish ever destitute of that
conscience which St. Paul speaks of as ‘accusing or excusing,’”
and then goes on to say, “But it is not thus with all the Natives
around us. Some of them are considerably enlightened, & feel the
importance of receiving further instruction. Darkness itself cannot
be seen without some light.” 32 The final comment perhaps proves
the most fruitful within this entry, that “considerably enlightened”
Natives “feel the importance of receiving further instruction.” Hoyt
clarifies that this band did not include some particularly areligious
or unthinking Cherokees, but instead could stand in for the whole
of the people outside of those who actively turned to the
missionaries for enlightenment. Thus, only involvement with the
missionaries and conversion to Christianity could break apart “the
thick darkness that shrouds their minds.” 33
This sentiment extends the ethnocentrism previously
outlined to religion, and creates a belief system which places value
on the missionaries as a saving, guiding force of light. The
emphasis on the missionary role of illuminating the ignorant and
darkened Cherokees has the practical effect of making missionary
ventures directly necessary, but it also furthers the paternalistic
approach that treated the Cherokees like children who did not
know better. Hoyt did not paint a picture of paganist people, but
32
33

Hoyt, July 26, 1818, entry in ibid, 75-76.
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instead took all religious/spiritual agency away from the Cherokees
and placed it within the hands of the missionaries, who could pull
the Cherokees from the grips of the darkness that surrounded them.
He fails to recognize, in any manner, that their belief systems and
abstract approaches may have little or nothing to do with an
afterlife, and may develop in a complex way in which he never
imagined. Instead, he characterizes these people as “stupid,
ignorant & unconcerned,” seemingly without any conscience irony
regarding the fact that they willingly entered into a discussion of
his beliefs while he failed to inquire about, and therefore even
remotely comprehend, theirs. Their lack of knowledge in regards
to his faith gave Hoyt enough evidence to draw conclusions of
their ignorance.
Not all missionaries diminished Cherokees’ agency to the
extent or in the way that Hoyt did in this instance, and not all
required the same strict white standards out of their converts. The
Methodists and Baptists, already less rigid in their missionary
structures, primarily due to their itinerancy, more openly admitted
Cherokees among their religious ranks. Similarly, the Methodists
and Baptists proved much more likely to ordain Natives as well as
admit them. The ABCFM ordained a few, but their nearly
impossibly unrealistic standards kept them from propagating a
Cherokee class of Congregational preachers, and correspondingly
made them rather critical of the Baptist and Methodist ordained
Native ministers. 34
In a parallel vein, the different denominations differed over
usage of the Cherokee language within conversion efforts, both
verbal and written, since Sequoyah had established the Cherokee
syllabary in 1827. Baptist and Methodist missionaries had a much
greater inclination to support utilization of the Cherokee language,
34

McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 83-90.
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believing, in their more egalitarian approach, it could help them
reach a much wider audience. Some Baptist and Methodist
ministers did their best to learn at least conversational Cherokee
and the larger organizations set out translating the Bible into a
written Cherokee format. Congregationalists, on the other hand,
resisted these bilingual efforts. The ABCFM summarized the
Congregationalist view in its first annual report when it claimed,
“Assimilated in language, they will more readily become
assimilated in habits and manners to their white neighbors.” 35
Samuel Worcester, the first corresponding secretary of the
ABCFM, expressed a similar sentiment when he said using the
Cherokee language “would perpetuate the dying Indian tongue.”36
The Congregationalists eventually relented and submitted to the
usage of the Cherokee language, but they always viewed this as a
temporary measure. 37
Missionaries in Relation
The savage mythos that surrounded Indigenous Americans
penetrated deep into the American psyche. Indian captivity
narratives circulated throughout early America and bloody stories
of Native barbarity – of hatchets, scalps, and war-whoops –
flooded the popular imagination and drowned out the voice and
35

Cited in McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 68. This sentiment –
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Samuel Worcester to Jeremiah Evans, July 1, 1815, ABCFM Papers, as cited
in McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 68
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For a much more intricate examination of Americans’ attitudes and
intellectual approach to Native American languages, see Sean P. Harvery,
“‘Must Not Their Languages Be Savage and Barbarous Like Them”: Philology,
Indian Removal, and Race Science,” Journal of the Early Republic, 30 (Winter,
2010): 505-532.
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presence of the actual Native Americans, as they became
caricatures or stereotypes, more animal than human. In his letter to
Andrew Jackson, then forwarded to Congress in February of 1832,
Secretary of War Lewis Cass outlines some of the prevailing
American views of the southeastern Indigenous tribes and the
Native American peoples in general. He accuses them of a
“predisposition to war,” of being “like children,” and of an
“indolence and improvidence” characteristic “of the Indian race.” 38
These assumptions of Indigenous character led Cass, and
many others, to conclude that the “Indian race” would soon go
extinct, especially if it maintained contact with the superior race
and culture of the white man. This argument stemmed from an
acceptance of the inevitability of white settlers encroaching upon
Native lands, which would shrink their lands to a size
unsustainable for their hunting way of life, thus ending it
altogether. This reality proved unavoidable in the march of
progress. In his Second Annual Message, President Jackson
articulated this racial determinism and its inexorability
Humanity has often wept over the face of the
aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has
been long busily employed in devising means to
avert it, but its progress has never for a moment
been arrested, and one by one have many powerful
38

U.S. Congress, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, Removal of Indians Westward,
Message from the President of the United States, upon the subject of the
contemplated removal of the Indians to the west of the River Mississippi,
February 16, 1832, Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, 1832,
(H.exdoc. 116), Washington: Thomas Allen, 1832 (Serial Set 219), 7, 9, 14.
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hold several somewhat contradictory views of Native Americans. The popular
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tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the
tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves
of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But
true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these
vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one
generation to make room for another . . . What good
man would prefer a country covered with forests
and ranged by a few thousand savages to our
extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and
prosperous farms, embellished with all the
improvements which art can devise or industry
execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy
people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty,
civilization, and religion? 39
People who held these views of Indigenous extinction often
predicated them upon the inability of the “savage” to change and
achieve the civilized way of life of their white neighbors. Once
again, Lewis Cass perfectly summarizes this view: “To collect
savage men together, who are ignorant of the very first rudiments
of civilization, who have, in fact, neither government, law,
religion, property, arts, nor manufactures; who are actuated by
impulse, and not by reflection; by whom the past and the future are
almost equally disregarded, and to teach them abstract principles,
is a process which seems, on calm reflection, to promise as little as
it has performed.” 40 Cass depicts the missionary efforts, and all
similar efforts to bring white civilization to the Indigenous
39
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Americans, as vain; due to the inferiority of the race of “savages,”
this race could never gain the implements of civilization and, as a
result, would go extinct.
Some have argued that the missionaries worked among the
Indigenous Americans throughout this era to grant salvation for
their charges in the next life, as opposed to civilization in this one.
Such an approach indicated a resignation, or perhaps
acknowledgment, or this-worldly betterment in the form of
missionary civilizing efforts. Roy Harvey Pearce followed this
train of thought in regards to the missionaries: “Missionary
societies proliferated; for conversion of the heathen Indian seemed
to be the only way to save him, Christianity being the one thing
which civilization could give him and not take away.” 41 Perhaps
this was true for some missionaries, as many expressed concern
over the souls of Natives: on January 11, 1818, Ard Hoyt
wondered, “And, if they are not enlightened by the Gospel, where
will be their immortal souls?” 42 Yet efforts to save Cherokee souls
does not exclude efforts to civilize them; missionaries taught
civilization alongside scripture, practical living alongside
theological ideals.
Beyond solely enacting plans to civilize Native Americans,
many missionaries posited that Indigenous Americans could
change, and some expressed satisfaction over past changes and
optimism over future prospects. Revered Thomas Roberts, a
Baptist missionary among the Cherokees, remarked, “The
Cherokee children learn as fast as any children I ever saw. They
are kind, obedient, and industrious. Their mental powers appear to

41
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Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 61.
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be in no respect inferior to those of whites.” 43 Jeremiah Evarts, in
his essayistic refutation of Indian Removal, went a step further in
his depiction of the Cherokees:
the Cherokees are neither savages, nor criminals . . .
they are peaceful agriculturists, better clothed, fed,
and housed, than many of the peasantry, in most
civilized countries . . . they have been encouraged
and aided, in rising to a state of civilization, by our
national government, and benevolent associations of
individuals;—that one great motive, presented to
their minds by the government, has uniformly been
the hope and expectation of a permanent residence,
as farmers and mechanics, upon the lands of their
ancestors, and their enjoyment of wise laws,
administered by themselves, upon truly republican
principles . . . and aided in the cultivation of their
minds and hearts by benevolent individuals
stationed among them at their own request, and
partly at the charge of the general government, they
have greatly risen in their character, condition, and
prospects;—that they have a regularly organized
government of their own, consisting of legislative,
judicial, and executive departments, formed by the
advice of the third President of the United States,
and now in easy and natural operation . . . that a
considerable number of the young, and some of the
older, can read and write the English language . . .
and, to crown the whole, that they are bound to us
43
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by the ties of Christianity which they profess, and
which many of them exemplify as members of
regular Christian churches. 44
Evarts, in his defense of the Cherokees remaining in their ancestral
homeland, pointed out the progress they had made towards
adopting white civilization. He displayed no signs of the extinction
expectation so common to prevailing contemporary American
racial thought.
Roberts and Evarts may have avoided the overt racism
inherent in the arguments of Jackson and Cass, but they still fell
prey to the ethnocentrism so vital to the construction of the
Indigenous image. 45 Evarts never attempts to depict Cherokee
culture as civilized, never considered it as a stand-alone equal to
white civilization. Instead, Evarts argues that the assistance of
“benevolent individuals” – whites – and their government pulled
the Cherokees out of the darkness of their savagery and into the
light of white, Christian civilization. Roberts, similarly, does not
remark upon the abilities of the Cherokee children as impressive in
and of themselves, but instead asserts their mental prowess in
relation to white children.
Although relatively sympathetic, missionaries construed the
Indigenous image through the lens of an all-encompassing
ethnocentrism, the same lens which framed and sustained the
44
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racism which pervaded their white contemporaries. The
prioritization of Euro-American agricultural pursuits, Christian
knowledge, and republican governance display more than solely a
desire to spread the American way of life. These efforts, combined
with depictions of the Cherokees prior to missionary and
government intervention, demonstrate a potent ethnocentrism
which bounded the missionaries’ objective ability to perceive their
Native neighbors. Barbara Perry explores this process in her work
Silent Victims. The inability to recognize value in the Cherokees as
the Cherokees, and instead of placing worth on Cherokees in
relation to whiteness, constructs an ethnocentric dynamic that
operates on multiple levels. Missionaries’ inability to recognize
Native religion as religion, Native agriculture as agriculture, and
Native government as government represents a broader trend in
which whites denigrated Native knowledge systems, and, by
extension, Native life. This inability to accept Native knowledge
systems as knowledge systems and Native life as a legitimate way
of life both manifested from white ethnocentrism and conversely
authenticated it. Usage of terms like “ignorant” and “darkness” and
then the eventual knowledge acquirement, or “enlightenment,” that
invariably came through a guiding white presence exposes the
valuation of understanding only in relation to white understanding.
Similarly, usage of terms like “savage” and “heathen” work in the
same manner, evaluating and valuing civilization only in relation
to white civilization, life only in relation to white life. This process
functioned within the larger undercurrent of what Perry
categorized as the racial/cultural genocide of Indigenous
Americans. 46
46

Barbara Perry, Silent Victims: Hate Crimes Against Native Americans
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Conclusion
Throughout the early nineteenth century, missionaries
worked on behalf of the Cherokees and did their best to give voice
to their cause. Many missionaries, such as Jeremiah Evarts,
passionately championed the Cherokees and continually defended
their rights to their land. Samuel Worcester and others went to jail
instead of recognizing the rights of Georgia over Cherokee land,
and helped build a public outcry against the injustice of the
Georgian landgrab and legal assertion over the Cherokee people.
Some missionaries, such as the Methodist Reverend James Jenkins
Trott, married Cherokee women and started families with them,
becoming a part of the tribe per Cherokee beliefs. Once antiRemoval efforts collapsed and forced emigration became a reality,
some missionaries, like Evan Jones, trekked the horrors of the Trail
of Tears alongside the Cherokees. 47
And yet, despite these relationships, and despite their
comparative racial progressivism, missionaries almost universally
viewed the Cherokees and other Indigenous Americans through the
same ethnocentrism that partially lent justification to Cherokee
removal and propagated the popular view of the warring and
degenerate savage. The framework of this ethnocentrism
constricted the friendships between the missionaries and the
Cherokees and their defense of the tribe. The missionaries believed
in Cherokee rights, but their Euro-American cultural centricity
knowledge and perspectives have been ignored and denigrated by colonial
powers seeking to exploit indigenous resources.” For more on how EuroAmerican/colonial beliefs had a self-validating function, see Pearce, “Character
and Circumstance: The Idea of Savagism,” Savagism and Civilization, 76-104.
47
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made them only able to assert these rights within the confines of
white values: private property ownership, cultivation and/or
exploitation of land, republican governance, and, most of all,
Christianity. The missionaries supported the Cherokees, not in
their right to live as Cherokees, but in their right to live as
acculturated Americans. 48
Recognition of the ethnocentrism present within
missionaries – who perhaps held the gentlest view of Indigenous
Americans – constructs a more complex comprehension of
American-Indian affairs in the early nineteenth century. Instead of
demonstrating a coalition of missionaries and Cherokees versus
Georgia and Jackson, such ethnocentricity breaks down this
binary-like dynamic and layers our understanding of the associated
relations, language, policies, and events of the time. One begins to
see that the Cherokee way of life faced an assault on all fronts:
Georgians and Jackson threatened their homeland while the
missionaries, their supposedly benevolent friends, assaulted their
culture and traditions. This enhanced complexity subsequently
lends itself to a more complex, nuanced understanding of
American-Indian relations overall, both past and present.

48

Beyond the ethical dilemmas surrounding forced assimilation, a slew of
practical issues arises as well. The scope of this analysis disallows a more
refined explanation of these practical issues, but a quick explanation suffices for
a cursory understanding. Cultural assimilation requires, and its advocates often
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did attempt acculturation – forfeiting the ways of life so vital to their selfidentities in pursuit of an impossible goal, which would leave them still depicted
as “savages.”

~ 132 ~

Similarly, these conclusions and the general approach can
serve to foster a greater understanding of early Americans and,
thus, early America. The significance of prevalent ethnocentrism
within missionary depictions and interactions with the Cherokees
raise the question of how ethnocentricity coated other
contemporaneous affairs. How did Americans view immigration
and assimilation, especially from non-Protestant, non-AngloSaxons, who they likely perceived as drastically different from
themselves? How did ethnocentricity inflect Manifest Destiny, in
both land acquisition from Indigenous tribes and from Mexico? In
what way does the assertion that “inferior” cultures/races face
extinction while in contact with “superior” cultures/races affect an
understanding of the support and effort to colonize freed blacks?
These questions fall well beyond the scope of this analysis, but
they all have intricate ties to the approach and conclusions of this
piece. Ethnocentrism saturated early American thought, and an
understanding of this creates a greater, more complex
understanding of American history, whether dealing with Cherokee
missionaries or something else entirely. When writing about the
Cherokees, nineteenth century missionaries provided us with a tool
to examine contemporary racial/cultural attitudes that illuminate
both topics directly and indirectly dealt with by the missionaries
and other topics they had no knowledge of.
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A Divided Front: Military Dissent during
the Vietnam War
By
Kaylyn Sawyer
~♦~
Emerging from a triumphant victory in World War II.
American patriotism surged in the 1950s. Positive images in
theater and literature of America’s potential to bring peace and
prosperity to a grateful Asia fueled the notion that the United
States could be the “good Samaritan of the entire world.” 1 This
idea prevailed through the mid-1960s as three-quarters of
Americans indicated they trusted their government. That positive
feeling would not last, and America’s belief in its own
exceptionalism would begin to shatter with “the major military
escalation in Vietnam and the shocking revelations it brought.” 2
The turmoil in social and economic spheres during the 1960s
combined with contradictions about America’s role in Vietnam and
realization of the government’s deception regarding the nature and
progress of the war itself fueled the largest movement of
servicemen and veteran dissent in this nation’s history.
The year 1965 would be pivotal in turning public opinion
against the war as three significant events coincided to raise public
consciousness. First, Ramparts magazine, founded in 1962 as a
liberal Catholic quarterly, published its first article on the war in
Vietnam in January of 1965 highlighting the contradictions
1
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between what America had been told about Vietnam and what was
actually occurring there politically. 3 Second, President Johnson
announced in July, that he would increase the number of troops
sent to Vietnam by 50,000. This would necessitate a doubling of
draft calls, seemingly in contradiction to the administration’s stated
goal of peace. 4 Finally, America was exposed to its first shocking
images of the war’s reality through television. CBS correspondent
Morley Safer, while accompanying US Marines on a search and
destroy mission, produced what is considered to be one of the most
controversial reports of the war. With images of US soldiers
torching civilian houses as a backdrop, Safer simply stated, “This
is what the war in Vietnam is all about.” 5 For the first time,
Americans saw that their troops were capable of committing
atrocities. These events galvanized civilian activists and sparked
the beginning of a dissent movement within the armed services.
GI resistance to the Vietnam War began in 1965 similar to
a ripple; it started with “individual acts of conscience,” but then
spread into collective acts of organized dissent within the ranks. 6
The earliest known example of GI protest occurred on November
6, 1965 in El Paso, Texas. Lieutenant Henry Howe joined a small
civilian peace demonstration, carrying a sign that stated, “End
Johnson’s Facist [sic] Aggression.” 7 Although Howe was not in
uniform, not on duty, and in apparent compliance with military
3

Robert Scheer, “Hang Down Your Head, Tom Dooley,” Ramparts, January
1965.
4
Pomfret, John D. “Johnson Orders 50,000 More Men to Vietnam and Doubles
Draft; Again Urges U.N. to Seek Peace.” New York Times. July 29, 1965.
5
Morley Safer’s Cam Ne News Broadcast. Accessed February 29, 2016. See
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNYZZi25Ttg.
6
Richard Moser, The New Winter Soldiers (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1996) 69.
7
David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War
(Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 1975) 52.

~ 140 ~

regulations, he was court-martialed and sentenced to two years
hard labor. In February of 1966, former Green Beret Donald
Duncan became the first Vietnam Veteran to publicly speak out
against the war. In his Ramparts magazine article entitled, “The
whole thing was a lie!” Duncan praised antiwar protestors, arguing
they were “opposed to people, our own and others, dying for a lie,
thereby corrupting the very word democracy.” 8 In October 1966,
Army doctor Howard Levy refused to train Green Beret medics
headed to Vietnam. His court-martial defense was based on the
Nuremberg principle requiring non-participation in war crimes or
genocide. Despite a protracted and publicized trial process, Levy
was convicted and sentenced to three years at Fort Leavenworth. 9
Before the summer of 1966, soldiers operated as
individuals in their dissent to the war. However, on June 30, 1966,
PFC James Johnson, PVT Dennis Mora, and PVT David Samas—
later known as the Fort Hood Three—became the first soldiers to
collectively oppose the war. They refused direct orders to board a
ship bound for Vietnam and stated in a press conference, “We have
decided to take a stand against this war, which we consider
immoral, illegal, and unjust.” 10 In an article published in The
Peacemaker periodical, Private Samas is quoted as saying during
his court-martial, “The Nuremberg trials established that soldiers
have the obligation to use their consciences in following orders.” 11
The GI resistance movement further grew to include issues
of racial identity. Marines William Harvey and George Daniels—
both African American—were the first Marines to openly question
8

Donald Duncan, “The Whole Thing Was a Lie!,” Ramparts 4, no 10, February
1966.
9
Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 52.
10
Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 69.
11
“Long Sentences for Three GI Refusers,” Peacemaker, September 17, 1966,
Gettysburg College Special Collections, Box 14 Folder 1, 5.

~ 141 ~

whether African Americans should fight at all in Vietnam. The two
men were arrested for asking to speak with their commanding
officer, charged with “insubordination and promoting disloyalty,”
and sentenced to prison. 12 African Americans again rose up as a
group on the night of August 23, 1968 in response to an executive
decision to send troops to the Democratic Convention in Chicago.
Over one hundred African American troops gathered at Fort Hood
to “discuss their opposition to Army racism and the use of troops
against civilians.” 13 The forty-three African American GIs arrested
became known as the Fort Hood Forty-Three.
While civilian peace activists had organizations to promote
their cause, it was not until April of 1967 that Vietnam veterans
had an organization of their own. In the streets of Manhattan, over
100,000 protestors gathered for what would be the largest rally in
New York since the war began. Vietnam veterans were asked to
march at the front, and the six who did so conceived Vietnam
Veterans Against the War (VVAW). One of the six veterans, Jan
Barry recalled how the organization came to be during the march:
Just as we got close…somebody said, “Vietnam
veterans go to the front”…Somebody had provided a
banner that said Vietnam Veterans Against the
War…So I tracked down this Veterans for Peace
group, went to one of their meetings, and discovered
there was no Vietnam veterans group, they just
brought along the sign, hoping some Vietnam
veterans would show up. 14
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Early statements of the VVAW claimed Vietnam was a civil war
with no American solution, and that the American people were lied
to about the nature of their country’s involvement. 15 GI resistance
was now represented by an official organization comprised of men
who had fought in the conflict and witnessed first-hand the realities
of the war.
The GI movement continued to grow and gain momentum
in 1968 as the war effort in Vietnam suffered. In April, forty GIs
led an antiwar demonstration in San Francisco, marking the first
time active-duty soldiers were at the head of a protest march. 16
Outside Fort Hood in Texas, soldiers gathered for a “love-in” to
listen to rock music and antiwar speeches. Again in San Francisco,
nine enlisted men went AWOL and took sanctuary in a church “in
moral opposition to the war.” 17 Later that year, twenty-seven
inmates from the Presidio stockade in San Francisco held a “sitdown strike” to protest the shooting of a fellow prisoner. The goal
of this “Presidio Munity” was to call attention to the unbearable
living conditions in the stockade. 18 The GI movement was now
widespread and organized. Americans, both outside and within the
military ranks, became increasingly disillusioned with their
country’s war effort in Vietnam.
Dissent and disobedience took many forms. Single
protests, collective demonstrations, and organized actions were not
the only ways for soldiers to dissent. Other effective ways of
undermining support for the war within the ranks were through the
publication of underground GI newspapers and through the
founding of coffeehouses near large military bases. GI newspapers
were a fundamental expression of political opposition within the
15
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military. By 1971, there were an estimated “144 underground
newspapers published or aimed at U.S. military bases” written by
active duty GIs, veterans, and civilian supporters. 19 These
underground newspapers were successful in reaching thousands of
service members, with some of the largest papers, such as Vietnam
GI, Camp News and The Bond claiming to reach tens of
thousands. 20 The GI Press Service was formed in June of 1969 as
an “associated press” of GI underground newspapers, functioning
as a national center for the distribution of articles. 21 The primary
function of most underground newspapers was to spread news of
the GI movement, acts of resistance, the military responses, and
general war news. Many of these papers were short-lived, but the
impact of their message was not.
August 1969 was a milestone in military underground
newspaper publishing when the antiwar paper Rough Draft gained
permission to be openly distributed at Fort Eustis in Williamsburg,
Virginia. Approval came from Major General Howard Schiltz after
a four-month-long effort by Rough Draft representatives. 22 In an
issue of the local newspaper, an army spokesman emphasized,
“This action cannot be construed in any way as an official
endorsement of the contents of the newspaper.” 23 On August 28,
1969, the Rough Draft was openly distributed on post. Future
permission for distribution would be granted on an “issue-by19
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issue” basis. 24The Rough Draft was fulfilling part of its stated
mission “to be a forum and a rally point for dissent” and “to
destroy the negative influence of apathy among the servicemen of
the armed forces and encourage them to stand for their rights.” 25
As a result of the victory at Fort Eustis, more antiwar papers were
allowed distribution on bases across the United States. The
underground newspaper no longer had to be underground.
In the absence of official approval for distribution on post,
newspapers found their way out to the soldiers through a series of
off-base coffeehouses, which served as a relaxed setting for GIs to
interact with each other and to read antiwar material. The
dissenting GIs who supported underground newspapers and
coffeehouses were not officers, but enlisted soldiers. Army veteran
Fred Gardner wanted the mainstream peace movement to see GIs
as potential antiwar allies instead of enemies. In January of 1968,
Gardner opened the first coffeehouse in Columbia, South Carolina
outside of Fort Jackson, and named it the UFO. Within a few
months of its opening, “an average of six hundred GIs a week were
visiting the place and antiwar activities were beginning to
develop.” 26 Gardner went on to open two more coffeehouses: the
“Oleo Strut” near Fort Hood, Texas and “Mad Anthony Wayne’s”
near Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The coffeehouses were
strategically located outside major military training bases to attract
unhappy GIs and give them an environment to voice their
complaints. Often staffed by civilians, coffeehouses fostered a
bond between soldiers and civilians, and served as a place where
they could come together and work collaboratively. 27 By 1971,
24
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there were as many as twenty-six established coffeehouses. 28 The
network of coffeehouses and the proliferation of underground
newspapers reflected the growing frustration and disillusionment
over the stalemate that war in Vietnam was becoming.
Racial and economic inequalities in the country during the
1960s provided motivation for dissent within the ranks as military
service did not eliminate the injustices of society at large. The
draft itself was biased against the poor and those without powerful
connections. The draft was appropriately compared to a regressive
tax, “falling on individuals whose income is low.” 29 Most often,
the drafted soldier belonged to the working class. The wealthy
could choose alternate avenues for service, afford full-time college
draft deferments, and obtain medical exemptions from private
physicians. Vietnam veteran Ronald Spector writes, “The
consideration that most determined a man’s chances of fighting
and dying in Vietnam was not race but class. It was the poor who
bore the lion’s share of the fighting and dying.” 30 The American
Serviceman’s Union (ASU), organized in trade union style to
lobby for more equitable conditions within the military, established
“a clear tradition of working-class resistance to military authority
and unjust war.” 31
Economic exploitation was only one issue raised within the
ranks as evidence of injustice. Racial prejudice and inequality
would prove to be a powerful source of dissidence and
disobedience, reaching crisis levels in 1968 and the following
years. The antiwar movement brought increased attention to racial
28
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issues within civilian society as well as within the ranks. African
American soldiers’ antiwar sentiments were encouraged by leaders
such as Mohammed Ali, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr.,
who all spoke out against the war. 32 One of the main issues raised
was whether African American soldiers should risk their lives for a
country that denies them basic rights at home. Civil rights leader
Julian Bond echoes this feeling in his graphic novel as he writes,
“Why are we always first citizens on the battlefield and second
class citizens at home.” 33 These were valid questions, as discussion
of the condition of American society and of the armed forces in the
mid-sixties will show.
Vietnam was the first war in American history in which the
military was fully integrated, and thus African American men
could see the potential for greater career opportunities and mobility
in the armed forces than in the civilian sector. In one study of
volunteer enlistments, African American soldiers often cited “selfadvancement” as the reason for enlisting while white soldiers cited
draft avoidance. 34 Once in the military, however, black soldiers
experienced the continuing consequences of racial discrimination
and institutionalized segregation and found “that educational
deficiencies barred them from qualifying for many of the highly
skilled or highly technical jobs.” 35 They felt discriminated against
in promotions, and they felt they were disproportionately
represented in combat units. These factors combined to spur
African American troops to be among the first antiwar advocates
32
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inside the military. 36 Because many black men could not afford
deferment status, African Americans were over-proportionately
drafted. The disproportionate assignment of blacks to combat arms
in a supposedly equal and desegregated military reflects the
continued impact of inequality in education. 37 Between 1961 and
1966, blacks accounted for 16% of soldiers killed in Vietnam, a
number out of proportion to their participation. 38 By 1967, the
military took action to reduce the number of black casualties by
reducing their numbers in front-line combat units. 39 By 1972, black
representation in the military (11%) and in casualty lists (12%) was
in proportion to their presence in the total population (11-12%). 40
While racial unrest was making headlines in the United States,
racial tension did not reach crisis levels among soldiers in Vietnam
until the 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. After
that, “signs of racial polarization and tension became clear and
unmistakable.” 41
African Americans were not the only minority group to be
affected by heightened racial consciousness and subjected to the
racial injustices of the Vietnam War. Latino and American Indian
communities had similar frustrations and offered a strong antiwar
presence as they found ways to collaborate with the black
community to voice their dissent. GIs United Against the War was
a dissent organization founded by African American Joe Miles that
36
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included black, Latino, and some white soldiers. Private Mora of
the Fort Hood Three was Latino, and at his trial stated, “We lived
in a tenement because we were Puerto Ricans” and implied that he
was limited in career opportunities because of his race. 42 While an
integrated Armed Force might have been able to soften the social
and educational deprivations suffered by minorities, it could not
eliminate them. In the heat of a highly- contested war, these
differences became magnified as race-based dissent within the
military was clearly linked to greater civil rights struggles for
minority and oppressed groups. 43
Meanwhile, the war effort in Vietnam was floundering. In
January 1968, the Tet Offensive revealed how desperate the
situation in Vietnam really was. On January 30, forces from North
Vietnam “struck seven major South Vietnamese cities, burning
government buildings, freeing prisoners, and lobbing rockets and
mortars onto military installations.” 44 This massive attack
repudiated any idea that a victory for the United States was within
sight. Tet exposed the government’s propaganda about the success
of the war, destroyed the sense of optimism about the war’s
progress, exposed the lies about the support of the South
Vietnamese for the American presence, served as a catalyst for
increased veteran resistance, and, in the words of Walter Cronkite,
demonstrated that “it seems now more certain than ever that the
bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.” 45 While
deemed a military success, the Tet Offensive convinced many
42
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Americans of the war’s futility and is considered to be a significant
turning point in the war, one that decimated troop morale and
galvanized veteran resistance. 46
Following revelations from the Tet Offensive, two
additional events served as key catalysts for increasing antiwar
activism among veterans. From December 1968 to May 1969, the
United States undertook a major offensive to gain control of a large
and heavily populated region of the Mekong Delta. 47 The success
of Operation Speedy Express was measured, as all ground and air
missions were, by body count of those killed. This created a
“single-minded focus on killing” which filtered down from a
command level through the ranks. The body count as a
measurement system was later denounced by one general as “A
great crime and cancer in the Army in the eyes of young
officers.” 48 By official standards, Operation Speedy Express was a
success because of the high body count. Later investigation would
reveal that many of those killed were noncombatant civilians,
exposing the indiscriminate brutality of this war. The second
incident occurred in 1969 in the village of My Lai when American
soldiers murdered hundreds of unarmed civilians. Once the story
was exposed in 1971, Americans were appalled that their “boys”
were capable of such violence. Antiwar veterans were further
frustrated by the lack of accountability at a command level and the
prosecution of low-level officers such as Lieutenant William
Calley, who was perceived as a scapegoat. This incidence of
brutality at My Lai led the Vietnam Veterans Against the War to
conduct the Winter Soldier Investigation, a hearing on war crimes,
in 1971. Their goal was to prove that “the use of terror and mass
destruction tactics against Vietnam’s civilian population was a
46
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pervasive phenomenon directly resulting from U.S. war policy.” 49
Operation Speedy Express and the My Lai Massacre exposed the
brutality of tactics, the failure of leadership, and the utter
immorality of the body count strategy that could no longer be
overlooked.
Men serving in the Armed Forces, by this time, had seen
enough hypocrisy, deception, and immorality in their leadership to
justify dissent and outright disobedience. Over in Vietnam,
soldiers saw clear evidence that the United States was neither
supporting democracy nor the will of the South Vietnamese
people. One Marine wounded in Vietnam recalled, “I think any
other war would’ve been worth my foot. But not this one. One day,
someone has got to explain to me why I was there.” 50American
soldiers were demoralized by the war’s brutal tactics and senseless
casualties. 51 Army veteran James D. Henry explained why he
became an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam: “My sole
motivation was and is to stop the atrocities and to stop the taking
of otherwise average young Americans and transforming them into
people capable and willing to perform atrocities.” 52 Embittered by
immoral rules of engagement, veterans returned home from the
war, “dehumanized by the senseless and indiscriminate
destructiveness of American policy.” 53 Additionally, tension
between drafted soldiers and career men created an environment of
distrust. Draftees made up half of the US Army by the summer of
1968, and as people who did not choose service; they found the
49
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strict regimen of military discipline to be overwhelming. 54 Career
officers resented the dissenting draftees. As the war dragged on,
resistance exploded, eventually reaching Vietnam itself.
The antiwar movement in the United States focused on
politics and thus differed from the antiwar movement that occurred
later in Vietnam, which focused on practical aspects of survival.
Instead of marching in protests or reading literature in
coffeehouses, soldiers in Vietnam protested the war by refusing
orders, avoiding the enemy, or by violently attacking the officer in
command. One of the most effective forms of GI resistance was
combat refusal, when soldiers refused, disobeyed, or negotiated an
order. 55 The first incident of combat refusal to appear in the news
occurred in August 1969. Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 196th
Light Infantry refused a direct order to attack, and the story
appeared in the New York Times. 56 Instances such as this brought
about a democratic form of military decision making with soldiers
having power over command. As a result, many commanders
found they would have to negotiate with their units over what they
were willing to do under certain circumstances. However, if
negotiations failed, antiwar soldiers would resort to fragging—a
term used to describe violence directed at superiors. 57 It was
organized and deliberate, with many of these attacks occurring on
base instead of during the fury of battle. By the time the last
American troops were leaving Vietnam in July 1972, the total
number of fragging incidents has escalated to 551 with eighty-six
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soldiers dead and over seven hundred wounded. 58Mutinous or
rebellious soldiers were imprisoned, and as a result, “prisons
became schools of resistance and sites of rebellion.” 59 The most
notorious prison riot occurred in 1968 at the Long Binh Jail, with
soldiers rising up to protest the poor living conditions they were
subject to. The unrest lasted for over one month, and is considered
to be the largest and most explosive episode of soldier resistance in
Vietnam. 60
Other GIs who opposed the war expressed dissent in a less
violent and direct way. The most pervasive kind of antiwar activity
in the military was known as “combat avoidance,” where “searchand-destroy missions were turned into search-and-avoid
missions.” 61 Instead of going out and fighting the enemy, soldiers
would go out and do their best to avoid any contact with the
enemy. One soldier recalled, “The military teaches you mission
first, man second. But because I felt the mission was stupid…the
men were much more important to me than the mission.” 62 This
was part of a larger nonviolent resistance movement that included
shamming: “the use of deception, stealth, ruse, and petty
sabotage.” 63
Soldiers also turned to drug use as a form of passive
resistance. Smoking marijuana was symbolically tied to the
antiwar movement back home, so soldiers were using drugs to
connect themselves to an antiwar stance. 64 By 1967, more
servicemen in Vietnam were arrested for marijuana charges than
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for any other major offense. 65 Colonel Robert Heinl reported that a
Congressional investigating subcommittee found that drug
addiction in the Armed Forces was “of epidemic proportions.” 66
When mental escape through drug use would not suffice, GIs
would simply walk away from the war they no longer believed in.
In 1967, American soldier William Percell applied for political
asylum in Sweden. He stated, “The United States war in Vietnam
is not my war. I have no wish to be an American any longer.” 67 He
was not alone. Between 1966 and 1971 army desertion rates
increased nearly 400%. 68 The Army desertion rate peaked in 1971
and steadily decreased afterward as internal reforms were
implemented and the burden of war shifted from ground assaults to
air assaults. Other branches of service then experienced internal
disruption with Air Force desertion rates peaking in 1972 and
Navy desertion rates peaking in 1973. 69 These branches also
experienced the same kind of dissent that had plagued the Army:
combat refusals, mutiny, and sabotage. 70
As the war effort was winding down and ground forces
were being withdrawn, dissent within the Army began to wane.
With fewer ground troops needed, the number of draftees was
likewise reduced and fewer men were pressed into service against
their will. On January 27, 1973, a peace agreement was signed that
officially ended America’s involvement in the war. On that same
65
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day, the Secretary of Defense announced that the draft would
end. 71 The Army would move towards an all-volunteer force, one
that would theoretically breed less dissent and disobedience. The
Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed
Force predicted, “Problems raised by the forced military service of
those who are unwilling or unable to adjust to military life will be
largely overcome by voluntary recruiting.” 72 The Armed Forces
would have stable ground upon which they would reconstruct
themselves after being nearly destroyed from within. The divisive
Vietnam War sparked radical dissent movements first from civilian
activists and then from activists within the military itself. What
began as isolated incidences of protest grew into collective acts of
dissent and disobedience within the ranks.
By the early 1970s the Army was no longer an effective
fighting force in Vietnam. Marine Colonel Robert Heinl wrote that
“by every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in
Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units
avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and
noncommissioned officers, drug ridden, and dispirited where not
near mutinous.”73 False and hypocritical war justifications,
deception about progress, indiscriminate brutality against civilians,
immorality in leadership decisions, and preexisting social
inequalities all combined to threaten the cohesiveness of the
service. This gave rise to the largest movement of servicemen and
veteran dissent in this nation’s history, one that would play a
71
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significant role in the decision to end the war and one that would
lead to lasting change in the armed services.
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